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This dissertation studies the effects of uncertainty shocks in emerging economies in a context where these 
economies increased their participation in international financial markets. The first chapter provides a review 
of the literature on how the study of uncertainty shocks recently became more relevant as a result of higher 
financial integration experienced by emerging economies.  
    The second chapter aims to investigate the quantitative effects on key domestic macroeconomic variables 
of implementing a foreign reserves accumulation policy with full sterilization. It extends an asymmetric two-
country model by introducing a global interbank market and an active domestic central bank. The goal of this 
policy is to mitigate the effect on the real economy of capital inflows that travel from a global bank in a large-
advanced economy to a commercial bank located in a small-emerging economy. In the presence of volatility 
shocks, the model shows that an aggressive policy of foreign reserves accumulation diminishes the volatility 
of output and the real exchange rate but reduces the welfare of the households. In the case of a sudden reversal 
of capital flows, the model indicates how the domestic central bank helps to restore the flow of funds towards 
the real economy when it functions as a lender of last resort.  
    The third chapter investigates how higher global financial integration recently experienced by emerging 
countries affects their accumulation of foreign assets. It extends a standard asymmetric two-country general-
equilibrium model by adding a time-varying total factor productivity (TFP) volatility process and recursive 
preferences. The results show that the domestic household can accumulate more foreign assets, but also hedge 
better against domestic risk. The trade-off is a more volatile consumption (both in absolute terms and relative 
 
v  
to output volatility). Higher integration improves households' welfare, but there seems to be no effect on risk-
sharing in the model. The persistence of the volatility shock strengthens the precautionary saving motive and 
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1 Literature Review
In his seminal paper, Bloom (2009) explores the impact of uncertainty shocks on the real economy.
An increase in the volatility of uncertainty shocks causes an initial fall in output and employment.
However, as investment recovers, the economy experiences a rebound. Bloom (2014) explains
two stylized facts related to the role of uncertainty in the economy. The rst one describes how
uncertainty increases in recessions, exacerbating the e¤ects of an economic slowdown, but drops
during booms. The second states that uncertainty is higher in developing countries than in advanced
countries.
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) show that the volatility of business cycles in developing economies is
higher relative to that experienced by advanced economies. Kohn et al. (2018) claim that the reason
behind this higher volatility is sectoral trade imbalances in emerging economies. By analyzing the
composition of trade balances, they show that these economies export more commodities than they
import.
Uncertainty shocks played an essential role during the Great Recession as a propagation and
amplication mechanism. Basu and Bundick (2017) and Bloom et al. (2018) investigate the e¤ect
of higher uncertainty on the real economy using di¤erent setups. The rst one incorporates nominal
rigidities to an otherwise standard general equilibrium model to analyze the role of monetary policy
when an uncertainty shock hits the economy. The second one augments a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model by adding heterogeneous rms to study the complementarity between
the rst and second moments shocks in a closed economy framework.
Other studies focus on the e¤ect of uncertainty shocks in an open-economy setup. Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. (2011) show how an increase in real interest rate volatility has a contractionary
e¤ect in a small open economy. Kollmann (2015) and (2019) incorporate this type of shock into a
setup with a two-country, one-good world with recursive preferences and complete markets. In the
rst study, he shows that volatility and risk appetite shocks are an essential source of uctuations
in net exports, net foreign assets, and the real exchange rate. In the second study, he explores how
recursive preferences are key to magnifying the response of the terms of trade to country-specic
shocks.
An augmented setup of the open-economy model includes two goods (domestic and foreign)
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and is useful to describe the relationship between relative consumptions and the real exchange rate
(Backus-Smith puzzle). In this context, Kollmann (2016) includes uncertainty shocks and recursive
preferences to explain the high empirical volatility of the real exchange rate. Additionally, Rouillard
(2018) includes nancial frictions (a shock to the borrowing capacity of a rm) and non-separable
preferences between consumption and labor to solve this puzzle.
Empirical studies have also been used to analyze the role of uncertainty shocks in the economy.
Fogli and Perri (2015) point out that there is a positive relationship between the volatility of output
and the accumulation of foreign assets in advanced economies. Gourio, Siemer, and Verdelhan
(2015) show that uncertainty, which is characterized by the volatility of a stock market index, is
an essential driver of capital inows (and outows) to (and from) emerging economies. Colacito et
al. (2018) develop a measure of volatility pass-through and examine the international propagation
of output volatility shocks to macroeconomic aggregates, equity prices, and currencies.
Other empirical studies concentrate their attention on the relationship between economic growth
and output volatility. In an inuential work, Ramey and Ramey (1995) state that this relationship
has a negative sign. Kose et al. (2006) re-examine this link by including both trade and nan-
cial integration into their study. The inclusion of these variables weakens the negative relationship.
Moreover, they nd a positive (although not highly signicant) correlation between output volatility
and nancial integration. Meanwhile, Mirdala and Svrcekova (2014) nd that while the relation-
ship between nancial integration, the volatility of nancial ows, and macroeconomic volatility is
positive, it is not signicant.
The study of the connection between output volatility and the degree of nancial integration
has also become relevant, given the nancial liberalization episodes experienced by both advanced
and emerging countries since the late eighties. Buch et al. (2005) conclude that the relationship
between this volatility and nancial openness has varied over time. Kumar Sahoo et al. (2019)
note that, in emerging economies, nancial integration reduces output volatility when the analysis
considers only ows of foreign direct investment. In terms of advanced economies, a reduction in
volatility takes place, analyzing either ows of foreign direct investment or ows of foreign portfolio
investment. Hence, conditions regarding economic, institutional, and nancial development are
also relevant.
Bai and Zhang (2012) show that nancial frictions (such as incomplete nancial contracts and
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limited contract enforceability in international nancial markets) prevent international risk-sharing.
The results of Pisani (2011) complement this idea, showing that frictions, such as limited access
to international liquidity, can cause short-run macroeconomic instability. However, Ratanavararak
(2018) shows that these frictions do not have adverse e¤ects on the economy unless low levels of
domestic nancial development also exist.
Several authors also point out the importance of nancial development in the process of nancial
integration across countries. Mendoza et al. (2009) show that di¤erences in the development of the
nancial system can explain the position and composition of the net foreign assets of a country.
Eozenou (2008) nds that when a country with a low level of nancial development experiences a
higher degree of nancial integration, the volatility of consumption rises (particularly in emerging
economies). This relationship also holds in the other direction. One of the indirect e¤ects of
higher nancial integration is the development of the nancial sector (adoption of new technologies,
implementation of new services). Kose et al. (2009) state that this e¤ect is more important than
any direct impact via capital accumulation or portfolio diversication.
To take advantage of the economic benets of nancial integration in terms of output growth
(Kose et al., 2011) or improved risk-sharing and consumption-smoothing possibilities (Kose et
al., 2003), emerging economies need to satisfy certain threshold conditions regarding the level of
economic, institutional and nancial development (Kose et al., 2003 and Chen and Quang, 2014).
For instance, Eozenou (2008) nds that a proxy for nancial development (the ratio of bank credit
to private sector as a share of GDP) should be around sixty percent.
Since the late eighties, emerging economies have experienced a surge in gross capital inows
from advanced economies. Although the global nancial crisis (GFC) slowed down this process,
loose monetary policies in advanced economies have created a scenario where these funds continued
owing independently from emerging economiesfundamentals (Giovanni et al., 2017). These cap-
ital inows can have expansionary e¤ects (Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2018) because of higher asset prices
(house prices, equity prices, appreciating real exchange rates), and as a result, a higher value of
collateral boosting the domestic credit market. Simultaneously, however, these inows pose a risk in
a less developed nancial system (Hossfeld and Pramor, 2018) and might increase the vulnerability
of these economies to new nancial crises (Borio and Disyatat, 2015).
Initially, the main components of the capital account in emerging economies were ows of foreign
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direct investment (FDI) and bond portfolio. As a result of liberalization and further developed
nancial systems, these economies shift in their external liability position toward equity investments
(foreign reserve accumulation improved their external position in bond portfolio) (Mendoza and
Smith, 2014). Schmitz (2013) notes that this shift allowed emerging economies to share part of
their country-specic macroeconomic risks with foreign investors. A well-known attribute of these
economies is the higher volatility of their business cycles, relative to those of advanced economies
(Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007).
Macroeconomic volatility a¤ects the accumulation of net foreign assets in advanced economies.
Fogli and Perri (2015) claim that this volatility is behind the external imbalances of their foreign
assets portfolio in the medium and long-run. Ho¤mann et al. (2019) show that countries with
higher macroeconomic uncertainty tend to accumulate higher external positions. Aizenmann and
Jinjarak (2019) relate these external positions to the provision of nancial bu¤er services by hoarded
foreign funds.
Empirical evidence shows that the higher global nancial integration recently experienced by
emerging countries has a¤ected their net foreign assets position (Lane and Milessi-Ferreti, 2017).
Valchev (2017) studies how home equity bias has declined in the last few decades as a result of
lower information fees. Hnatkovska (2019) examines the role of hedging motives in the decline of
the home equity bias recently experienced by advanced and emerging economies. Chakraborty and
Dekle (2009) show how the nancial liberalization experienced in East Asia in the nineties can be
characterized as a reduction in the cost of international bond transactions.
The globalization of the banking system became an essential channel in the transmission of funds
before the last GFC. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) and (2012) addressed how liquidity shocks in
the nancial sector of advanced economies a¤ected the provision of funds in emerging economies.
This event is consistent with the nding of a global nancial cycle in gross cross-border ows by Rey
(2016) and Passari and Rey (2015), and the existence of macroeconomic spillovers from advanced
economies to emerging economies caused by these capital ows (Banerjee et al., 2016). Similarly,
Giovanni et al. (2017) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) nd evidence that domestic credit cycles
are related to those inows independently from the recipients country fundamentals.
Aizenman and Pinto (2013) explore how emerging economies learned from experiences in -
nancial crises during the nineties and implemented policies to self-insure their nancial systems.
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Conversely, advanced economies excessively deregulated their nancial systems and were vastly
a¤ected by the GFC. Emerging economies exhibited remarkable resilience during the last crisis.
Notably, central banks in emerging economies played an essential role by implementing macropru-
dential policies in response to the recent surge of gross capital inows. One of them is the o¢ cial
foreign reserve accumulation.
Adler and Tovar (2011) and Aizenman and Lee (2008) present two reasons for implementing
this type of macroprudential policy: (1) a precautionary motive: the central bank accumulates
foreign funds in case a sudden stop of those inows hits the economy, and funds become more
scarce (a¤ecting their relative price). (2) A macro-management motive: an excess of foreign funds
a¤ects the relative price of those funds (an appreciating real exchange rate), and that result spills
over into the economy.
Durdu et al. (2007) nd three important mechanisms that motivate a precautionary demand for
foreign assets: increases in the cyclical volatility of output, international nancial integration, and a
sudden stop risk. Aizenman et al. (2019) examine the currency composition of these foreign assets
before and after the GFC across economies. They nd that determinants such as the composition
of their trade balance (whether they export commodities or not) and valuation e¤ects matter in
the analysis of the demand for foreign currency.
As Menkho¤ (2013) explains, foreign exchange stability has e¤ects on gross domestic product
(GDP) and the overall economy, though through di¤erent channels. In a more integrated world,
international trade is a crucial variable for growth in emerging economies. A managed exchange
rate improves the volume of exports in these economies (with a positive e¤ect in the domestic labor
market) and a¤ects the price of imported goods (and therefore, the ination rate). Additionally,
in an emerging economy with liability dollarization, this stability can protect the domestic banks
and rms from currency mismatches and the resultant adverse balance-sheet e¤ects (Cespedes et
al. ,2004), which have contractionary e¤ects on the economy.
In particular, De Gregorio (2011) focuses on the Chilean case and surveys how the reserve
accumulation policy implemented by the Central Bank of Chile has two objectives: (i) precautionary
saving to mitigate the e¤ect of a sudden stop and (ii) to a¤ect the real exchange rate. In the same
vein, Adler et al. (2015) analyze how foreign exchange interventions in response to capital inows
a¤ect uctuations in the real exchange rate. Additionally, Obstfeld et al. (2010) relate the foreign
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reserve adequacy to the size of a banking sector that is exposed to nancial ow uctuations.
One strand of the literature that studies these interventions focuses on how and why the central
bank sterilizes them. Alberola and Serena (2007) analyze the role of sterilization in containing the
monetary costs of implementing a reserve accumulation policy. Chang (2018) studies sterilization
in a context where domestic banks in a small economy borrow from the world but face nancial
constraints. Benes et al. (2015) study how sterilized interventions can protect the economy against
nancial shocks. Adler et al. (2015) show that sterilized interventions in the market for foreign
exchange are an e¤ective instrument to achieve nancial stability. Yun (2018) points out an adverse
e¤ect of the sterilized interventions in that they a¤ect the balance sheet of commercial banks, so
they could crowd out borrowing to non-nancial rms.
Other authors focus their research on the optimality of the policy and the use of foreign funds.
Carroll and Jeanne (2009), and Jeanne and Ranciere (2006) build theoretical models to analyze
the precautionary role of the optimal level of foreign reserves. Bianchi et al. (2018) and Arce et
al. (2019) study the use of an optimal accumulation of international reserves as a hedge against
rollover risks, and as a macroprudential policy that reduces exposure to nancial crises, respectively.
Benigno and Fornaro (2012) analyze how the reserve accumulation policy responds to capital inows
in order to a¤ect the real exchange rate and to promote economic growth.
Finally, some authors explore alternative motives behind the accumulation of foreign reserves.
Dominguez (2010) claims that governments in emerging economies act like nancial intermediaries
to eliminate the distortions that arise in countries with underdeveloped nancial markets. Delatte
and Fouquau (2012) suggest that the main reason behind this policy is a mercantilist motive. For
instance, Vujanovic (2011) show how countries such as China and Japan hoard foreign assets at a
level well above the normal behavior of the rest of the world.
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2 Capital ows, global banks and foreign reserve accumulation in
an emerging economy
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, emerging economies have experienced a surge in gross capital inows from advanced
economies. Although the global nancial crisis (GFC) slowed down this process, loose monetary
policies in advanced economies have created a scenario where these funds continued owing inde-
pendently from emerging economiesfundamentals (Giovanni et al., 2017). The globalization of the
banking system became an essential channel in the transmission of these ows before the last GFC
(Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011 and 2012).
Central banks in emerging economies have been playing a vital role by implementing macropru-
dential policies in response to the surge of gross capital inows. One of these policies is the o¢ cial
foreign reserve accumulation. Adler and Tovar (2011) and Aizenman and Lee (2008) present two
reasons to justify these policies: (1) a precautionary motive and (2) a macro-management motive.
Adler et al. (2015) show that interventions in the market for foreign exchange, mainly sterilized
interventions, are an e¤ective instrument to achieve nancial stability.
This study aims to investigate the quantitative e¤ects on key domestic macroeconomic variables
of implementing a foreign reserve accumulation policy. Additionally, the study examines whether
this policy implementation has welfare e¤ects on the agents in the emerging economy. Given these
goals, it extends an asymmetric two-country model by introducing a global interbank market and
an active domestic central bank that implements a policy of foreign reserves accumulation with full
sterilization.
The policy follows a simple rule that depends on the real depreciation rate. Its implementation
has two degrees: a moderate one and an aggressive one. They depend on the "leaning against the
wind" stance the central bank wants to adopt. The goal of this policy is to mitigate the e¤ect on
the real economy of capital inows that travel from a global bank in a large-advanced economy to
a commercial bank located in a small-emerging economy.
To carry out the investigation, I perform two exercises in the model. The rst one analyzes the
e¤ects of policy implementation when volatility shocks hit the economy. The second one evaluates
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the reaction of the emerging economy to a reversal of foreign ows. It mimics the markets reaction
during the "taper tantrum" episode in 2013. In each exercise, I compare a scenario where the
domestic central bank implements the policy at a certain degree with a scenario without policy
implementation.
The motivation for studying these events follows (1) Fogli and Perri (2015), who point out
that time-varying uncertainty is a signicant factor in the context of open economies. (2) Gourio,
Siemer, and Verdelhan (2015), who show that uncertainty is an essential driver of capital inows
(and outows) to (and from) emerging economies. (3) Durdu, Mendoza, and Terrones (2007), who
explore how a sudden stop risk motivates a precautionary demand for foreign assets. (4) Bernanke
(2015) discusses the global market turbulence that followed the Federal Reserves announcement
regarding ending its large-scale asset purchases program.
The quantitative model nds that the e¤ectiveness of the policy depends on the degree of its
implementation and the shock experienced by the domestic economy. By implementing this policy,
the domestic central bank diminishes the volatility of the real exchange rate relative to the volatility
of output. Nevertheless, the cost of this nancial stability is that the policy does not increase the
level of output. Moreover, it reduces the welfare of the households in the emerging economy.
On the other hand, the policy is more e¤ective when a sudden reversal of foreign funds shocks
the economy. Under an aggressive policy, the economy recovers faster, and there are some gains in
welfare. Another signicant result is the role played by the central bank as a lender of last resort.
When there is a shortage of foreign funds in the domestic economy, the central bank provides funds
to the domestic commercial bank and restores the ow of funds toward the real economy.
This investigation combines elements from three strands of the literature. The rst one is
about foreign reserves accumulation. This investigation focuses on the implementation of a reserve
accumulation policy in emerging economies and complements Gregorio (2011) who describes the
two goals of this policy by the Central Bank of Chile: (i) precautionary saving to mitigate the e¤ect
of a sudden stop and (ii) to a¤ect the real exchange rate. It also complements other studies that
focus on di¤erent roles for the accumulation of international reserves. For instance, Bianchi et al.
(2018) study the use of an optimal as a hedge against rollover risks. Benigno and Fornaro (2012)
analyze how the reserve accumulation policy responds to capital inows to economic growth.
The second strand is about the role of a global banking system. Obstfeld et al. (2010) relate the
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foreign reserve adequacy to the size of a banking sector exposed to uctuations in nancial ows.
Kollmann et al. (2011) and Kollmann (2015) study the role of global banks in the international
transmission of the GFC. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) analyze how nancial integration via global
banks increases the e¤ects of total factor productivity (TFP) shocks across countries. Cuadra and
Nuguer (2018) investigate the role of global banks on the transmission of shocks from advanced
economies to emerging economies.
The third strand is about sterilized interventions. Alberola and Serena (2007) analyze the role
of sterilization in containing the monetary costs of implementing a reserve accumulation policy.
Chang (2018) studies sterilization in a context where domestic banks in a small economy borrow
from the world but face nancial constraints. Benes et al. (2015) study how sterilized interventions
can protect the economy against nancial shocks.
The rest of this document is organized into the following sections. The next section (2) de-
scribes the motivation for holding foreign reserves. Section 3 introduces the quantitative model.
Section 4 discusses the benchmark calibration and presents the main results. Section 5 outlines the
conclusions.
2.2 Motivation
Capital inows have expansionary e¤ects (Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2018) because of higher asset prices
(house prices, equity prices, appreciating real exchange rates) and as a result, the value of collateral
assets increases and boosts the domestic credit market. These funds also pose a risk to less developed
nancial systems (Hossfeld and Pramor, 2018), such that their vulnerability to new nancial crises
may increase (Borio and Disyatat, 2015).
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) and (2012) addressed how liquidity shocks in the nancial sector
of advanced economies a¤ected the provision of funds in emerging economies. Their results are
consistent with the nding of a global nancial cycle in gross cross-border ows by Rey (2016) and
Passari and Rey (2015), and the existence of macroeconomic spillovers from advanced economies
to emerging economies caused by capital ows (Banerjee et al., 2016). Similarly, Giovanni et al.
(2017) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) nd evidence that in emerging economies (independently
of their fundamentals), capital inows intensify the domestic credit cycles.
The foreign reserve accumulation policy has been heavily implemented in many emerging
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economies, where, according to Obstfeld et al. (2017) "the average reserve has more than quintu-
pled, from four percent to over twenty percent of GDP." Figure 2.1 illustrates this nding. In 2016,
developing countries had fty-one percent of the global amount of reserves held by central banks
worldwide. In particular, developing Asian countries had thirty-six percent of the total amount
and the Latin American economies, ve percent1.
Analyzing representative countries in each continent2, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present the foreign
reserves as a proportion of GDP and the share of foreign reserves in the total foreign assets held
by a country, respectively. On average, the ratio of foreign reserves over GDP is thirteen percent
in the Asian economies and nine percent in the Latin American economies. The stock of foreign
reserves as a share of total foreign assets held by a country, on average, is around fty-three percent
in the Asian economies and thirty-seven percent in the Latin American countries.
Adler and Tovar (2011) and Aizenman and Lee (2008) present two reasons to justify these
policies: (1) a precautionary motive: the central bank accumulates foreign funds in case a sudden
stop or a reversal of inows hits the economy, and the foreign funds become scarcer (therefore,
a¤ecting their relative price). (2) A macro-management motive: an excess of foreign funds a¤ects
the relative price of those funds (an appreciating real exchange rate), and that result spills over
into the economy and a¤ects its competitiveness.
The October 2018 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) published by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that policy normalization in advanced economies "has led to a tight-
ening of nancial conditions that is similar, on aggregate, to the taper tantrum episode in 2013"
(Figure 2.5). As Sahay et al. (2014) state, the e¤ects of Federal Reserves announcements could
be sizable in emerging economies (Figure 2.6) and directly related to countries fundamentals.
Weak fundamentals will accelerate capital outows from the private sector in these countries and
could harm their growth prospects. To prevent a shortage of foreign funds, the central bank in an
emerging economy, as a precautionary motive, increases its demand for foreign assets.
To complement the facts observed in the data, and described above, an empirical exercise3 inves-
tigates the relationship between the accumulation of foreign reserves and business cycle volatility.
1Figure 2.2 conrms that foreign funds continued owing into emerging economies after the GFR, independently
from their fundamentals and the global context.
2Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) and Asia (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Thailand, and Turkey)
3Details regarding the empirical exercise are in Appendix 2.A.
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This volatility is dened as the standard deviation of the cyclical component of the real gross do-
mestic product (RGDP) over a ve-year rolling window. The sample includes a set of advanced and
emerging economies4. In particular, it studies this relationship in emerging economies by restricting
the sample to only this type of small economy.
The result shows a statistically signicant positive relationship between the macroeconomic
volatility experienced by a country and the stock of foreign reserves, both in an advanced and in an
emerging economy. This nding is consistent with the results of Fogli and Perri (2015) regarding
the precautionary motive of the reserves, and Aizenman et al. (2008) who point out the use of
international reserves as a bu¤er. Durda et al. (2007) nd three important mechanisms that
motivate a precautionary demand for foreign assets: increases in the cyclical volatility of output,
international nancial integration, and a sudden stop risk.
Additionally, there are two statistically insignicant results in the estimation. A negative re-
lationship between the real exchange rate (the deviation from its mean) and the stock of foreign
reserves, and a positive relationship between foreign borrowings and the stock of foreign reserves. It
also shows a statistically signicant positive relationship between macroeconomic volatility and the
ination rate. These two results hold independently of the sample used in the estimation (Appendix
A, Table 2.4, models 1 and 2).
China holds almost fty percent of the total stock of foreign reserves in the world (Wen (2011)).
To study whether there is a Chinese inuence in the results presented above, I restrict the sample
to only emerging economies excluding China from this group. The result of this estimation (Ap-
pendix A, Table 2.4, model 3) shows that the relationship between the macroeconomic volatility
experienced by a country and the stock of foreign reserves is still statistically signicant, although
the signicance of the ination rate appears only in one specication. Therefore, the precautionary
motive described above is relevant in the other emerging economies even so their share of the total
stock of foreign reserves is smaller than the Chinese one.
4Advanced Economies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Korea, New Zeland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.




2.3.1 Structure of the model
The structure of the model is an international real business cycle model with trade in goods,
nancial frictions, time-varying business cycle volatility, and a global banking system. It builds
on the work of Kollman (2011), Gertler and Karadi (2011) and, Agenor et al. (2014), (2018).
The world consists of two countries: the home economy and the foreign economy. The size of this
world is normalized to one, where the home economy has measure m, and the foreign economy has
measure 1 m.
An important assumption is that the home country behaves like a small open economy, that is,
its measure approaches zero. Therefore, it is unable to a¤ect the foreign country. The domestic and
foreign economies share the same preferences, technologies, and market structure for the intermedi-
ate and nal goods. Time is discrete, and households live innitely. In summary, the model shows
the interaction between and within economies of a representative household, an intermediate-goods
producer, a nal-goods producer, a nancial intermediary, a government, and a central bank.
This study introduces a global interbank market and an active domestic central bank. In each
economy, commercial banks transfer funds from households (savers) towards non-nancial rms
(lenders). Moreover, the commercial bank in the foreign economy is a global bank and can invest
in the home economy by lending, without any constraint, to the domestic commercial bank. One
could imagine a context where the latter behaves as a subsidiary/branch of the former and the
global bank in the foreign economy transfers funds to the home economy. An active domestic
central bank implements a foreign reserves accumulation policy. The monetary authority buys
(sells) foreign funds from (to) the domestic commercial bank. This active role is necessary to help
ensure the strength of the domestic nancial system and the overall economy.
The following subsections will provide a detailed description of the home economy. Unless
specied, the typical household in the foreign economy solves a similar optimization problem and
will be presented only if necessary (an asterisk denotes a foreign variable).
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2.3.2 Households
Each economy has a representative household that lives innitely and owns the non-nancial rms
and the nancial intermediary. The household supplies labor (Nt) to the intermediate goods-
producing rm. There is no labor mobility across countries. The household consumes the nal good
(Ct) and they save in two ways at the beginning of the period: by holding a domestic government
bond denominated in domestic goods (BHt ) and by providing funds, as deposits (Dt); to a nancial
intermediary (i.e., the domestic commercial bank). Domestic government bonds and bank deposits
in the domestic commercial bank are perfect substitutes (both of them are also riskless securities),
the only di¤erence being that holding funds in a deposit account increases the utility level of the
household.
Each period, the household enters into the economy with the following nancial wealth: gross
interest income on bank deposits with rate rDt 1 set at t  1, and gross interest income on maturing
domestic government bonds with rate rt 1 set at t  1. The household collects these funds at the
end of the previous period, once the goods market closes. Additionally, the household receives any
prots made by the non-nancial rms and the commercial bank. The bank closes at this point,
and a new bank opens at the beginning of the next period (as in Agenor (2014)).
At the beginning of the period, the household chooses the levels of consumption of the nal
good, bank deposits, and the stock of domestic bonds. The household also supplies labor services
to the intermediate goods-producing rm and is paid the real wage (wt) (measured in terms of the
price of a domestic nal good, the numeraire in the economy). The household also pays a lump-sum
tax (Tt), which they assume as given. Since the household owns all the rms (non-nancial and
nancial ones), Jt enters into the budget constraint as the sum of all the prots from those rms
that the household collects at the end of the period.
Therefore, the household faces the following budget constraint:
Ct +Dt +B
H
t = wtNt   Tt + (1 + rDt 1)Dt 1 + (1 + rt 1)BHt 1 + Jt (2.1)
The representative household chooses allocations for consumption, labor, bank deposits, and

















0(Ct) > 0; U 00(Ct) < 0 and  is the consumers subjective discount factor
(0 <  < 1):
A signicant feature of this model is that holding deposits in a bank account provides utility to
the household (as liquid resources in the future). This treatment is similar to the "money in utility
function" models where real balances give utility per se to the households. The transfer of funds
from the households to the commercial bank is a¤ected by the preference parameter (D).













(1 + rt) (2.4)
Dt =
D(1 + rt)
(rt   rDt )
[Ct]
 (2.5)
Equation (2.4) represents the intertemporal decision between present consumption and future
consumption. Equation (2.5) characterizes the demand for bank deposits. Since these transactions
carry no risk, the household will deposit more funds into the banking system; the higher is the
interest rate (rDt ) the bank promises to pay. The household takes this interest rate as given. Equa-
tion (2.3) denes the labor supply, which depends on the real wage and the current consumption
level.
2.3.3 Non-Financial Firms
The goods industry is composed of two sectors in each economy: (1) A continuum of rms producing
a tradable intermediate good and (2) an aggregator rm producing the nal good. Next, I will
describe each sector in detail and will address how the production processes vary between countries.
Final good Producers Problem
A perfectly competitive nal good producer combines units of the domestic intermediate good
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(Ht) with some units of the foreign intermediate good (Ft). This producer uses a constant elasticity















where Yt denotes the domestic production of the nal good. This good is consumed domestically in
each economy. It is also used for investment, either domestically or abroad (more on this allocation
in the next subsection). The parameter  measures the elasticity of substitution between home
tradable input and foreign tradable input, and the parameter ! is the share of domestic tradable
input in the production of the nal good. There is home bias in production. Following Sutherland
(2005), ! combines the openness of the economy ($) and the relative size of the economy (m).
Therefore, the weight of imported goods is 1   ! = $(1  m): The parameter $ 2 [0; 1]; where 0
means a closed economy and 1, a completely open economy. Given that the domestic economy is
a small open economy, m! 0:













 1   PHt Ht  QtPFt Ft , (2.7)
where PHt is the relative price of the domestic intermediate good (Ht); expressed in units of the
domestic nal good. PFt is the relative price of the foreign intermediate good (Ft); expressed in units
of the foreign nal good. Qt is the real exchange rate. An increase (a decrease) in Qt represents a
real depreciation (real appreciation). Since there is home bias in the production process, the law
of one price will not hold at an aggregate level.
The optimization behavior of the rm produces the demand functions for each input. This
demand depends positively on the production of the nal good, and it depends negatively on the














Combining equations (2.8) and (2.9) with (2.6) produces an expression that relates the relative








Similarly, in the foreign economy there are equivalent expressions for the equations described
above, where F t is the quantity of the foreign intermediate good used in the production of the
foreign nal good (Y t ) and H

t represents the units of the domestic intermediate good used abroad:




















Intermediate good Producers Problem
The representative intermediate goods-producing rm combines labor (Nt) and capital (Kt)
with the available technology (At) in each country to produce a tradable good (Y It ) that will be
used as an input in the production of the nal good either domestically or abroad. The production
function is a standard Cobb-Douglas function which satises the usual Inada conditions. It has
constant returns to scale, i.e. the capital share in production () and the labor share in production
(1  ) add up to one.




The total factor productivity (TFP) in each country follows an exogenous autoregressive process
with time-varying volatility. To characterize the time-varying business cycle volatility, Vt is intro-
duced as the innovations to the standard deviations of the TFP error term. Each country has its
own autoregressive processes for the TFP and its volatility. Each error term of these processes
(At and 
V
t ) has a standard normal distribution. The parameter i (i = A; V ) determines the
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persistence of each process.
At = AAt 1 + Vt
A
t (2.15)
At  N (0; 1)
lnVt = V lnVt 1 + V 
V
t (2.16)
Vt  N (0; 1)
At the beginning of each period, once the productivity shock (At) occurs, the producer goes to a
competitive domestic labor market and hires the labor services (Nt) provided by the representative
household. The labor market clears at an equilibrium wage wt (expressed in terms of the nal good).
The entrepreneur faces a working capital constraint and needs to apply for an intratemporal loan.
This loan will be repaid at the end of the period once the entrepreneur collects the proceeds from the
sales of the intermediate good. The parameter & represents the fraction of labor externally nanced.
Dao and Liu (2017) show how the working capital channel functions in developing countries using
data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
In each economy, the rm owns and accumulates the capital over time, at a cost qt. Capital
as input is immobile across countries, but the way the rm accumulates it in each country di¤ers.
In the domestic economy, the rm increases its stock by combining domestic (IHt ) and foreign
nal (IFt ) goods. The rm in the foreign economy only uses the nal good produced there (I

t ).
















Similarly to the production of the nal good, 2 measures the elasticity of substitution between
home nal good and foreign foreign good, and !2 is the share of domestic nal good in the pro-
duction of the new domestic capital. There is also home bias in the production of new capital,
!2 > 0:5.
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In any case, the rm reuses the capital that did not yet depreciate. Equations (2.18) and (2.19)
show the evolution of the capital stock in each economy;  is the depreciation rate.
Kt+1 = It + (1  )Kt (2.18)
Kt+1 = I

t + (1  )Kt (2.19)
In each economy, since the producer collects the payment at the end of the period, he needs to
borrow from the nancial intermediary (Lt and Lt in each country, respectively) to buy the inputs
involved in the production of new capital (that is, domestic and foreign nal goods in the domestic
economy and foreign nal goods in the foreign one). In each economy, the commercial bank charges
rLt and r
L













The rm transfers the prot to the household once it sells all the production, it charges PHt
per good (denominated in units of the domestic nal good), pays for the services of the factors of
production and it serves the debt with the commercial bank. Given their ownership of the rm,









264 PHt Y It   wtNt   rLt &wtNt   (1 + rLt 1)Lt 1 + Lt   IHt  QtIFt 
 qt[Kt+1   (1  )Kt]
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Equations (2.22) and (2.23) relate the payments of each factor of production with their marginal
productivities. Equation (2.24) associates the demand functions for the domestic nal good used
as investment with its borrowing cost in the home country. Equation (2.25) shows the relationship
of the demand functions for the domestic goods used as investment and its foreign counterpart.
Domestic tradable goods-producing rms on the subinterval [0;m] are located in the home
country, and foreign tradable goods-producing rms on the subinterval [m; 1] are located in the
foreign country. As was previously mentioned, the intermediate goods-producing rm supplies the
inputs to the production of the nal good. Some production satises the demand for the domestic
nal-good producer (Ht), and the residual production is exported to the foreign economy(Ht ). In
equilibrium:




The foreign intermediate good producer solves a similar problem, although it charges PFt per
good (denominated in units of the foreign nal good) and it only uses foreign nal good as an
investment good to produce new capital. Therefore, the optimization condition with respect to






(1 + rLt ) , (2.27)
where qt is the value of capital in the foreign economy and r
L
t is the interest rate paid on the bank
loan.
In a similar way, in equilibrium the allocation of intermediate goods produced by this foreign
rm satises:









The interbank market has two commercial banks, which operate in a traditional way. In each
economy, the commercial bank transfers funds from households (savers) towards non-nancial rms
(lenders). A key characteristic of this model is that the commercial bank from the foreign economy
also behaves as a global bank5. Hence, it can invest in the domestic economy by lending, without
any constraint, to the domestic commercial bank. One could imagine a context where the latter
behaves as a subsidiary/branch of the former, located in the domestic economy. The global bank
in the foreign economy uses this institution to transfer funds to the domestic economy.
Domestic commercial bank
The domestic commercial bank plays a vital role in the model. It acts as a nancial intermediary
that reallocates resources across the economy. The bank collects funds from the domestic household
as deposits (Dt). Then, it uses those funds to satisfy the demand for funds (Lt) from the domestic
intermediate-goods producer. Following Dib (2010), this prot-maximizing bank has market power.
This feature assumes some degree of concentration in the banking industry. As noted by Wu et
al. (2017), the banking industry in Asia and Latin America can be characterized as monopolistic
competition.
Moreover, the domestic bank has a second source of funds. It receives foreign funds from the
global bank (LFBt ) at the beginning of the period and then transfers the revenue by the end of it.
Therefore, the transfers are a liability in its balance sheet. The domestic bank chooses the stock
of funds, and it assumes the interest rate associated with it as given. The rate comes from the
optimization problem of the global bank. Wu et al. (2017) also found that foreign bank penetration,
as a result of economic reforms, increases banking competition in the host economies and therefore
improves the allocation of resources.
The assets side of the balance sheet of the domestic bank consists of (1) the loans to rms (Lt),
which are used to buy new capital from domestic and foreign sources (it is assumed that, indepen-
dently, they carry the same risk). (2) A required amount of reserves due to the deposit insurance
policy implemented by the central bank (  is the reserve requirement ratio). (3) Government bonds
(BCt ) transferred by the central bank when it implements the reserve accumulation policy with full
5From now on, I will refer to the foreign commercial bank as the global bank.
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sterilization, the purchase of foreign funds in exchange for these bonds. On the liabilities side,
the domestic bank has (1) the Deposits (Dt) collected from domestic households, (2) the foreign
borrowings from the global bank and (3) borrowings from the central bank (LCBt ) which also acts
as a lender of last resort (discount loans).
Lt +  Dt +B
C





The prot stream of the domestic bank consists of the ow of funds going into and out of
the banking system, plus the returns derived from those funds. The parameter eL represents a
credit risk derived from the loans issued to the domestic rms. It is a premium over the risk-free
rate, given the higher-risk nature of the transaction. Additionally, a quadratic adjustment cost







is introduced to prevent perfect substitutability
between domestic funds and foreign funds.
Bt = Dt   (1 + rDt 1)Dt 1 +QtLFBt   (1 + rFBt 1)QtLFBt 1 + LCBt   (1 + rt 1)LCBt 1
 (1  eL)Lt + (1 + rLt 1)Lt 1    Dt +  Dt 1  BCt +BCt 1  ACt (2.30)
The bank maximizes its discounted sum of cash ows (2:30) subject to balance sheet constraint
(2:29) by choosing the interest rates. Since the domestic household owns the commercial bank, it
discounts the stream of prots using its stochastic discount factor. After applying (2:29) at t and
t+ 1 to (2:30), the banks optimization problem reduces to:
Max



































where L and D are the inverses of the interest elasticity with respect to loans and deposits,
respectively.
The optimality conditions introduce the deposit rate (rDt ); the lending rate (r
L
t ) and the foreign
borrowings (LFBt ). The deposit rate is the rate that the commercial bank pays to the household per
deposit (expressed in units of the domestic nal good). This rate is lower than the reference rate
because of the reserve requirement ratio, which as has been emphasized by Agenor et al. (2018),
acts as a tax. Equation (2:32) presents the lending rate (rLt ) the commercial bank charges the
intermediate goods-producing rm, and because of the credit risk entailed in the transaction, it
is greater than the reference rate. One simplication of this model is that the commercial bank
charges the same fee independently of how the rm uses the proceeds (that is, to buy domestic
nal goods or foreign nal goods).
The last equation (2:33) shows the number of foreign funds transferred from the foreign global
bank to the domestic commercial one. It depends on the di¤erence between the interest rate the
foreign bank expects to get for those loans and the domestic reference rate.
Global bank
In the foreign economy, the global bank operates like a traditional bank. As in the domestic
economy, the global bank reallocates resources across the foreign economy. Furthermore, global
bank transfers resources to the domestic economy. Given this interaction, the balance sheet of the












The global bank also behaves as a monopolistic competitive rm, so it sets the interest rates.
The optimization problem of the global bank determines these rates: the deposit rate (rDt ); the
lending rates to local loans (rLt ) and to foreign loans (r
FB
t ). The rst two rates are similar to ones
















Equation (2:37) shows the interest rate that the foreign bank collects by lending to its domestic
branch. This rate can be decomposed into the foreign reference rate (rt ) and a mark-up (GRt).
This variable characterizes the global risk factor, which is a variable that proxies the existing risk
around the world. It follows Giovanni et al. (2017), who show that capital ows into emerging
economies when the global risk-appetite is high, independently of these economiesfundamentals.
The authors conclude that these inows have an impact on the local credit cycles. In the model, a
lower GRt will increase the spread between rt and rFBt ; hence the domestic economy will experience
an inow of foreign funds.
This global risk factor (GRt) follows an exogenous autoregressive process (AR(1)). The para-
meter GR determines the persistence of this process, and the parameter 
2
GR, its variance.
lnGRt = GR lnGRt 1 + GR
GR
t (2.38)
GRt  N (0; 1)
2.3.5 Central Bank
The model introduces an active domestic central bank. In addition to two conventional tools at
its disposal: (1) reserve requirement and (2) discount loans to the commercial bank (lender of last
resort), the central bank implements a foreign reserve accumulation policy. As in Chang (2018), the
monetary authority fully sterilizes the foreign exchange intervention. In the model, the policy works
as follows; the central bank accumulates foreign reserves (RFt ) by exchanging foreign funds (L
FB
t )
with the domestic commercial bank. To compensate these exchanges, the central bank provides
bonds issued by the government (BCt ) to the domestic commercial bank.
The goal of the central bank is to avoid large uctuations in the real exchange rate. Cesa-
Bianchi et al. (2018) nd that capital inows appreciate the exchange rate of the recipient economy.
Indeed, this boom-bust scenario in capital ows appreciates any asset price in the economy. Given
the scope of this study on the ow of funds through a global bank, the source of amplication is the
23
real exchange rate, and according to these authors, the o¢ cial foreign reserve accumulation is an
appropriate stabilization policy. By implementing this policy, the central bank promotes nancial













The policy follows a simple rule ( Ft ) that positively links the foreign funds entering into the
economy and the foreign reserves held by the central bank.  Ft depends on the real depreciation
rate and a parameter,  F , that characterizes the strength of the intervention ratio in the steady-
state. Outside of the steady-state, the ratio depends negatively on the real depreciation rate. 1
also weights the strength of the policy. It measures the degree of smoothing of the real depreciation
rate, i.e. it characterizes a "leaning against the wind" stance from the domestic central bank.
An inow of foreign funds through the global banking system appreciates the real exchange rate
in the domestic economy. By implementing this policy, the domestic central bank extracts some of
these funds from the real economy and accumulates foreign funds in its balance sheet. In order to
avoid uctuations in the value of the domestic goods related to this policy, the central bank also
applies a full sterilization policy, where it provides bonds issued by the domestic government in
exchange for foreign funds to the domestic commercial bank. The last operation leaves the central
banks balance sheet invariant6.
To simplify this procedure (and avoid quasi-scal costs), the model assumes that the bonds held
in the banking system do not pay a return. This simplication is debatable given the scal costs
originating from these operations. As Hauner (2006) explains, the existence of quasi-scal costs






As will be described in the next subsection, the central bank transfers the foreign funds to the
6An outow of foreign funds operates in an opposite way. The Central Bank introduces foreign funds into the
banking system and extracts domestic government bonds.
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government, and the latter uses those funds to buy bonds issued by the foreign government.
2.3.6 Government
The government setup in the model follows Agenor (2014). The intertemporal governments con-







t = Gt + (1 + rt 1)B
H
t 1 (2.42)
The domestic government collects funds through lump-sum taxes (Tt) and uses them to buy do-
mestic goods (government spending (Gt)). This expenditure exceeds the taxes collected. Therefore,
there is a primary decit, and the government issues a one-period riskless bond. Moreover, these
bonds are only traded domestically, and it is assumed that this debt is a xed proportion of the
GDP (Bt = BCt +B
H
t =
B 8t). Hence, the bonds are held by either the domestic household and/or
by the central bank (or the commercial bank when there is a policy implementation). Potential
prots from the funds loaned by the central bank are transferred to the Government. As specied
above, the bonds held by the commercial bank pay no interest (no quasi-scal cost), unlike the
ones held by the households.
In the foreign country, the government has a similar setup, although it diverges in the com-
position of the agents holding the one-period riskless bond the government issues. This debt is
still a xed proportion of the foreign GDP (Bt = B
 8t), but now it is held by either the foreign
households (who receive rt as interest payments) or the domestic central bank, when it intervenes,
but without any interest payment, as was specied above. Given the small size of the domestic
economy, the share of foreign bonds held by the domestic central bank is insignicant relative to






2.3.7 Market Clearing and Balance of Payment
Combining equations (2:26) and (2:28) with demand equations from the domestic and foreign
economies (2:8) and (2:9), and (2:11) and (2:12), respectively; the allocation of intermediate goods
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in both countries is reexpressed as:



























The equilibria in the domestic and foreign markets for nal goods are as follows:




t +Gt +NXt (2.46)
GDP t = C
















t = 0 (2.48)
By combining the equations above (2:46, 2:47, and 2:48) with the budget constraints of the
household (2:1) and the government (2:42), and the transfers of prots from the non-nancial
and nancial rms, an expression for the Balance of Payments arises. This equation is important














The objective is to study the quantitative e¤ect on key domestic macroeconomic variables of a
reserve accumulation policy implemented by the central bank in the domestic economy. Given this
goal, the parameters in the model are calibrated using values from the literature and data from two
countries: Chile (as the baseline emerging economy) and USA (as the baseline advanced economy).
Additionally, I use as reference a subset of countries from the data presented in section two. This
subset is divided into two groups: Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) and
Asia (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey). The periodicity is quarterly
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Parameter values are summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 : Calibration
Advanced Emerging Source/Target
Economy Economy
 Capital Share 0.36 0.36 Fogli and Perri
 Discount factor 0.99375 0.98625 BKK + Risk premium
 Depreciation rate 0.025 0.025 Fogli and Perri
 Frish elasticity 0.5 0.5 Fogli and Perri
Nss Labor - steady state 1/3 1/3 Ls = 8 hours
N Preference par - Labor 40.78 62.21 N̄=1/3
N Preference par - Deposits 0.0012 0.0006 Ratio deposit/output
 Elasticity for/dom goods 0.9 0.9 Heathcote and Perri
$ Openness 0.20 0.35 USA and Chile
m Size 0.95 0.05 Cuadra and Nuguer
! Home bias 0.99 0.6675 Openness + Size
D Inv Interest elasticity deposits 0.001 0.001 Dib (2010)
L Inv Interest elasticity loans -0.001 -0.001 Dib (2010)
  Reserve req. ratio 0.075 0.075 Fogli and Perri
e Credit risk 0.009 0.009 Spread = 4%
 Government Spending 0.15 0.15 Data7
 Risk aversion 2 2 Fogli and Perri
FB Risk premium parameter 0.0014 0.0014 Reserves/GDP = 0.1
& Working capital parameter 0.35 0.35 Dao & Lui
 F Res accum. steady-state 0/0.3/0.6 Exercise8
1 Rule: Weight on RER 0.25/0.6 Exercise
In the household sector, the discount factor usually equals 0.99 (Backus et al., 1992; 1995). To
have an actual country-risk premium like the one observed in the data, there is a wedge between the
7Data from World Development Indicators. Countries: Median value in emerging economies: Latin America
(Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) and Asia (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey).
Advanced economy: USA
8Exercise: Two policy regimes: Moderate policy and Aggressive policy
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domestic and the foreign discount factors. The di¤erence is equal to 0.0075. Hence, the country risk
premium equals 3%, a value inside the range observed in Latin American countries (ranging from
149 basis points (bps) in Chile to 470 bps in Brazil (sample countries), and an average of 519 bps
in Latin America). In the emerging economy, this parameter is equal to 0.98625, which represents
an annual interest rate of 5.5%. In the foreign country, the discount factor equals 0.99375, which
corresponds to a 2.5% annual interest rate.
The preference parameter for deposits (D) is calibrated to obtain a ratio of bank deposits over
GDP around 25%-35% in the domestic economy and around 45% in the foreign economy. This value
is also consistent with the balance sheet constraint faced by the commercial banks. It is important
to note that, in both economies, this ratio is less than the one observed in the data, which reects
a more sophisticated banking system (on average, a ratio of bank deposits over GDP equal to 40%
in the Chilean economy and 65% in the USA). The remaining parameter in the household sector,
the risk aversion parameter, is standard in the literature. It is equal to 2.
In the production sector, some parameters are standard values taken from the literature. The
depreciation rate  is 0.025 per quarter for both countries. The capital share  in the production
function is 0.36 for both economies. The elasticity between home and foreign tradable goods
() is an essential parameter in measuring the interaction between the two countries. Following
Heathcote and Perri (2015) and Stockman and Tesar (1995), this parameter is set equal to 0.90
and, for simplicity, the same value applies to both countries. The home bias in production depends
on the openness and the size of the economy. The size of the small economy is 0.05. Nuguer and
Cuadra (2016) assume that the size of the emerging economy is 4% relative to the world. Using
data for the US and a set of Latin American countries, openness goes from 0.2 to 0.35. Thus, the
home bias is 0.6675 for the emerging economy and 0.99 for the advanced economy. It is noticeable
that the foreign country behaves mostly as a closed economy.
The model assumes a banking sector with market power as in Dib (2010); therefore the inverses
of the elasticity of interest rate on deposits and the elasticity of interest rate on loans are equal
to 0.001 and -0.001, respectively. It is important to note that the model features a basic and
traditional banking system. The credit risk premium is calibrated to obtain a spread between the
lending rate and the deposit rate equal to 4.5% annually in the domestic economy, which seems
to be slightly below the values observed in Latin American countries according to the World Bank
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database (WDI-WB).
To evaluate the quantitative e¤ect on key domestic macroeconomic variables of a reserve ac-
cumulation policy, I compare a scenario where the domestic central bank implements the policy
with a scenario without policy implementation. Moreover, when the domestic monetary authority
decides to implement, it has two options (a moderate policy and an aggressive policy). Each of
them characterizes the aggressiveness of the policy. The parameters involved in the policy rule
(2:39) are  F and 1: In a moderate policy,  
F and 1 are equal to 0.3 and 0.25, respectively. The
goal is to target a ratio of foreign reserves to GDP ratio around ve percent, which is below the
average shown in the data for a representative sample of Latin American countries, (8%), but close
to the value shown by the biggest economies in the continent (Brasil 6% and Mexico 5%). (2) In
an aggressive policy,  F and 1 are equal to 0.6 and 0.6, respectively. It targets a ratio of foreign
reserves to GDP ratio around thirteen percent, which is above the average (8%) described above,
but closer to values found in countries like Chile (11.8%) and Peru (12.5%). In the scenario of no
policy implementation, these parameters are equal to zero.
The central bank in each economy implements a reserve requirement policy. In the data, this
liquidity ratio is usually between 1% and 45%. In the model, its value is 0.075 in both economies,
which is consistent with the values observed in Latin America (Chile, 4.5%; Mexico, 10.5%; Peru,
8%). FB = 0.0014 targets the ratio of foreign borrowings over GDP (12%) in Chile.
To complete the calibration, the domestic and foreign TFP processes, their volatility processes,
and the global risk processes need to be dened. The values for the TFP processes were computed
using the Penn World Tables database. The values for the global risk were computed using the
CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index from Fred database. Standard values taken from the literature
complemented these values.
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Table 2.2 : Calibration - Shocks
Advanced Emerging Source/Target
Economy Economy
A Persistence TFP 0.90 0.90 BKK (1992)
V Persistence Volatility 0.90 0.90 Data - PW tables
9
GR Persistence Global Risk 0.80 Data - FRED
10
A Volatility TFP 0.01 0.035 Heathcote and Perri
V Volatility Volatility 0.01 0.025 Data - PW tables
GR Volatility Global Risk 0.004 Data- FRED
Correlation TFP 0.40 Fogli and Perri
The persistence coe¢ cient of productivity shock is 0.90 in both economies. The data shows
that the volatility is higher in the emerging economy than in the advanced economy; therefore, the
standard deviation of persistence shock is 0.035 in the domestic economy and 0.01 in the foreign
economy (values for the foreign economy taken from Heathcote and Perri (2015)). The persistence
coe¢ cient of the volatility shock is 0.90, and its standard deviation is 0.025 in the domestic economy
and 0.01 in the foreign economy. This persistence coe¢ cient increases to 0.9999 in the sensitivity
analysis of the results. The persistence coe¢ cient of the global risk is 0.8, and its standard deviation
is 0.004. The latter shock has an e¤ect on the determination of the foreign borrowing from the
domestic commercial bank, and hence, it a¤ects the foreign reserves accumulation policy from the
emerging economy. Parameter values of the shock processes are summarized in Table 2.2.
In terms of aggregate quantities, the targets for the long-run values of the components of GDP
are the following: the ratio consumption over GDP is standard and targets approx. 0.60 in both
economies. This value is slightly lower than the values founded in the data - 0.61 in the emerging
economy and 0.66 in the advanced economy. The ratio of investment over GDP is standard, and its
target is around 0.20-0.25, which is closer to the value found for both the emerging and advanced
economies. Similar to other studies, investment is higher in the advanced economy.
9An AR(1) process was computed for the cyclical component of the TFP and its volatility using data from the
PennWorld tables. Countries: Emerging Economies: Chile .Advanced economy: USA
10An AR(1) process was computed for the cyclical component of the VIX and its volatility using data from Fred.
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Gov. Spending/GDP 0.15 0.11
Net Exports/GDP -0.01 0.01
Foreign Reserves/GDP 0.12
The ratio of government spending over GDP is 15% for the advanced economy, and, for sim-
plicity, I use the same target for the emerging economy (even when in the representative sample
of Latin American countries and also in the one using Asian countries, the government spending
over GDP ratio is around 11.5%). Lastly, the target for net exports in the domestic economy is
a low value, 1%, consistent with the data. The values for the emerging economy were computed
using the WB-WDI database and the Central Bank of Chile. The values for the advanced economy
(USA) were computed using the Fred database. Target values are summarized in Table 2.3.
Solution of the model. As pointed out by Fogli and Perri (2015), a third-order approximation
is necessary to capture the impact of changes in the volatility of shocks and to guarantee the
stationarity of the variables in the model. Caldera et al. (2012) show how a third-order perturbation
method is competitive in terms of accuracy with global approximation methods. Specically, I
use the Dynare toolbox to implement a third-order pruned state-space, following the approach of
Andreasen et al. (2016). Born and Pfeifer (2014) echo the discussion of the use of perturbation
and pruning techniques and their implications for the impulse-response functions.
2.4.2 Discussion
This study aims to investigate the quantitative e¤ects on key domestic macroeconomic variables
of implementing a reserve accumulation policy with full sterilization. The domestic central bank
implements this policy to mitigate the e¤ect on the real economy of capital inows that travel
through a global banking system (from an advanced economy). To carry out this investigation, I
perform two exercises. The rst one analyzes the e¤ects of policy implementation when volatility
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shocks hit the economy. The second one evaluates the reaction of the emerging economy to a
reversal of foreign ows. It mimics the markets reaction during the "taper tantrum" episode in
2013. In each exercise, I compare a scenario where the domestic central bank implements the policy
with a scenario without policy implementation.
The baseline scenario is the one without policy implementation. When the domestic central bank
decides to accumulate foreign reserves, it can choose between two degrees of policy implementation:
(1) a moderate policy where, in equilibrium (and on average), the ratio of foreign reserves over GDP
is around ve percent. (2) An aggressive policy where, in equilibrium (and on average), the ratio
of foreign reserves over GDP equals thirteen percent approximately.
The mechanism that operates the ow of funds in the model is the following: Either a variation
in the uncertainty of the TFP or a sudden capital ow reversal has a direct e¤ect on the real
interest rates and the real exchange rate. The di¤erential of domestic and foreign real interest rates
adjusted by the expected depreciation rate determines the ow of funds from the advanced economy
towards the emerging economy. A higher (lower) domestic (foreign) real interest rate attracts more
funds to the emerging economy. At the same time, an inow or outow of funds a¤ects the real
exchange rate in the domestic economy and reinforces the change of the di¤erential. An expected
real appreciation promotes the inow of funds and appreciates (even more so) the real exchange
rate today. An expected real depreciation has the opposite e¤ect.
In the real economy, changes in the real interest rate a¤ect the borrowing costs of the rms,
altering the accumulation of capital (given the necessary external funding) and the hiring of labor
(given the working capital constraint). They also modify the saving pattern of the household via
domestic government bonds and bank deposits. The latter result a¤ects the domestic funding
of the commercial bank in the domestic economy. Additionally, variations in the real exchange
rate have an impact on the cost of the foreign nal goods used in the production of the domestic
composite investment good and the cost of the foreign intermediate good used in the production
of the domestic nal good.
Stochastic steady-state
The mean of the third-order approximation of the model to a Monte Carlo simulation11 of all
11Simulation: 3,500 times; 550 periods, rst 150 observations dropped. Final number of periods: 400 periods. It
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of the shocks12 characterizes the stochastic steady-state. The shocks follow a Normal distribution.
Tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 summarize the main results. There are three possible scenarios. The rst
scenario describes an economy without intervention policy, where the ratio of foreign reserves over
GDP is equal to zero. The results corresponding to this scenario are in the "No Policy" column.
The second scenario corresponds to moderate policy intervention. In the steady-state, the ratio of
foreign reserves over GDP equals around ve percent. The results corresponding to this scenario
are in the "Policy I" column. The last scenario reports an aggressive policy intervention. In the
steady-state, the ratio of foreign reserves over GDP equals around thirteen percent. The results
corresponding to this scenario are in the "Policy II" column. As one can observe in the upper panel
of Table 2.5, the aggressiveness of the policy is positively related to the increase of foreign funds
arriving in the domestic economy through the global banking system.
The middle panel of Table 2.5 shows how the real exchange rate reacts when the domestic
central bank implements the policy. With a moderate policy, the change in the real exchange rate
relative to a no-policy scenario is negligible. Nevertheless, its volatility decreases by four percent.
A similar, although more drastic, result occurs with an aggressive policy. The real exchange rate
depreciates around one percent, and its volatility decreases by ten percent. This result is consistent
with the objective of the central bank and conrms the e¤ectiveness of the policy and the "leaning
against the wind" stance. Furthermore, the real exchange rate is negatively related to the stock of
reserves held by the central bank (lower panel of Table 2.5), a result consistent with the data. Adler
et al. (2015) also show that interventions in the market for foreign exchange (primarily sterilized
interventions) are an e¤ective instrument to achieve nancial stability.
The upper panel of Table 2.6 illustrates that the e¤ect on output of each implemented policy
relative to a no-policy scenario is negligible. The policies slightly decrease output, less than 0.5% in
each case. The analysis of the mean values of key macroeconomic variables in the model presents
a similar outcome (middle panel of Table 2.6). The changes in consumption (as a share of GDP),
investment (as a share of GDP), net exports (as a share of GDP), and real exchange rate are
minimal. A more interesting result is the one related to the e¤ect of the policies on the second
moment of these variables. The volatility of output decreases around one percent and three percent
corresponds to 100 years.
12The shocks are domestic and foreign TFP shocks, domestic and foreign volatility of TFP shocks, and global risk
shock.
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when the central bank implements moderate and aggressive policies, respectively (upper panel of
Table 2.6). The lower volatility is a result of the reduction in the volatility of the real exchange
rate described above.
The policy implementation decreases the volatility of investment, net exports, and real exchange
rate relative to the volatility of domestic GDP (lower panel of Table 2.6)   the more aggressive
the policy, the higher the reduction in the volatility of a variable. The lower volatility of the real
exchange rate a¤ects the cost of the foreign nal good involved in the composition of the domestic
investment good, and, hence, the relative price of the domestic nal good. With the implementation
of an aggressive policy, the volatilities of investments and net exports (relative to the one of output)
decrease around eleven percent, respectively. Nevertheless, the correlation between these variables
and output is barely a¤ected (upper panel of Table 2.7), and the values are consistent with the
ones observed in the data - positive for investment, and negative for net exports.
An opposite result occurs with the volatility of consumption relative to the volatility of domestic
output - this ratio increases (lower panel of Table 2.6, second row). It is a well-known fact that
in emerging economies, consumption is more volatile than output, but the result of this model is
still intriguing. The volatility of consumption moves in the opposite direction to the volatility of
domestic output (hence the ratio increase). A possible explanation for this outcome is that the
consumption good has no relationship with the real exchange rate in the model. Adding this feature
to the model could be a potential avenue for future research.
Welfare Analysis. Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), the welfare (Wt) obtained by the
representative household is equivalent to the discounted sum of its utility over time. When the
central bank implements a policy, it will a¤ect the time path of consumption, bank deposits, and
labor. Therefore, the policy will have an impact on the welfare of the household. This variable Wt
can be expressed in a recursive form as:
Wt = U(Ct; Nt; Dt) + Wt+1 (2.50)
The welfare of the household decreases when the central bank implements the policy. The
intuition is that the central bank extracts resources from the economy and uses those proceeds
to buy foreign assets. Without intervention, the resources could be e¢ ciently allocated in the
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domestic economy. The trade-o¤of this outcome is that the allocation could generate some nancial
instability. When the central bank implements a moderate policy, the welfare decreases by 0.23%,
relative to the no-policy scenario. Meanwhile, under an aggressive policy, the welfare decreases by
1.45%, relative to the no-policy scenario.
Volatility shocks
After a shock (one standard deviation) to the volatility of the TFP13 hits the economy, one
can observe two slightly di¤erent results depending on the degree of the implemented policy. In
both cases, higher volatility of the domestic TFP a¤ects the real exchange rate, the domestic real
interest rates, and, through these variables, the real side of the economy (Figure 2.7).
As said before, the degree of the implemented policy plays a role in the adjustment path. Under
an aggressive policy, there is a continuous (albeit smooth) appreciation of the real exchange rate
over time (Figure 2.7, panel B). On the other hand, with a moderate implemented policy, the real
exchange rate returns to its long-run equilibrium (Figure 2.7, panel A). A more aggressive stance
by the central bank could act as a signal to the global bank regarding its commitment to sustaining
the stability of the domestic nancial system. Therefore, it encourages the global bank to transfer
resources to the domestic economy (more on this in the next paragraph). At the same time, this
stance allows a faster recovery of the borrowing costs of foreign funds, which adds pressure on the
real exchange rate.
Transferring resources to its domestic branch is a forward-looking decision for the global bank.
It depends on the expected real exchange rate and the interest rates di¤erential. As a result of
real appreciation, there is an inow of funds from the advanced economy. To prevent further
appreciation, the domestic central bank implements the policy. Moreover, under the aggressive
policy, the capital inows are more stable (the path is atter than the one in a moderate policy,
Figure 2.7, panels A and B). Hence, the central bank has a stronger reaction (recall that its rule
reacts to an appreciation of the real exchange rate) and extracts more resources. The monetary
authority uses these funds to buy foreign assets (foreign government bonds). The result is consistent
with the precautionary saving motive described in the empirical exercise.
13The result of a shock to the volatility of the foreign TFP is symmetric and operates in the opposite direction. It
is available upon request.
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In any case, the continuous ow of foreign funds into the domestic economy also a¤ects the
domestic real interest rate, and by that, the borrowing cost of the rms. As the uncertainty
disappears, under the moderate policy, the real interest rate returns to its long-run equilibrium
(Figure 2.7, panel A). However, under the aggressive policy, it approaches its long-run equilibrium
from below in the long-run (Figure 2.7, panel B), a consistent result with the more stable path of the
foreign funds described above and the expansionary e¤ects of these funds shown by Cesa-Bianchi
et al. (2018).
The adjustment path of the real interest rate a¤ects the real side of the economy. Initially,
it increases and has contractionary e¤ects. Investment falls as a result of higher borrowing costs.
Hence, output and consumption drop. Labor has the opposite reaction to consumption but then
falls over time. As the persistence of the shock decreases, the real interest rate falls, going towards
(or below, as described above) its long-run equilibrium level (Figure 2.7, panels C and D), This
reaction promotes a slightly higher investment relative to a no-policy situation.
Over time, as investment starts to increase due to lower borrowing costs and the e¤ect of a real
appreciation (foreign nal good is cheaper than the domestic one), the economy recovers. Output
grows, and consumption also slowly augments (Figure 2.7, panels C and D). The impact on output
and consumption is higher with the implementation of an aggressive policy (Figure 2.7, panel D).
This result originates a wealth e¤ect in the household as labor falls below its steady-state value in
the medium-run.
The loss in welfare shown above is consistent with the response of consumption, bank deposits,
and labor to a volatility shock. Hoarding resources by the domestic central bank causes an initial
fall in consumption. As the economy recovers over time, consumption starts to grow. Nevertheless,
the e¤ect of longer-term values in the consumption stream is smaller, given their lower associated
discount factor. Labor shows the opposite pattern, consistent with the wealth e¤ect experienced
by the household as the economy approaches its long-run equilibrium. The fall in consumption is
more signicant when the aggressive policy is implemented, and that explains the higher loss in
welfare.
Capital ows reversal
As Burns et al. (2014) state, the tightening of global nancial conditions had a direct e¤ect on
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emerging economies. Furthermore, counter-cyclical macroeconomic and macroprudential policies
have helped these economies "to deal with a retrenchment of foreign capital." To evaluate the
model, I simulate a foreign capital ow reversal as a deterministic exogenous shock. There are no
volatility shocks. The arbitrary initial point is the deterministic steady-state of the baseline model.
The simulation has 120 periods, which corresponds to 30 years. The foreign discount factor falls
after the 6th period, and the drop lasts 80 periods. This variation a¤ects the foreign interest rate
and, consequently, the interest rates di¤erential. At the 87th period, the foreign discount factor
increases and stays at this value until the last period. The agents in the domestic and foreign
economies know the future path of this parameter. Figure 2.8 displays the adjustment paths of
some of the variables in the model. In particular, Panel A shows the trajectory of the foreign
discount factor.
The initial steady-state value for the foreign discount factor equals 0.99375, which corresponds
to a foreign real interest rate equal to 2.5% (baseline calibration). Therefore, in the steady-state, the
interest rates di¤erential equals 3.5%. The foreign discount factor falls to 0.99 after the 6th period.
This value corresponds to a foreign real interest rate equal to 4%. The interest rate di¤erential
reduces to 2%. At period 87, the foreign discount factor increases to 0.9924 (a foreign real interest
rate equal to 3%). Table 2.8 summarizes the results under the two policies.
As expected, before the shock takes place, the global bank will start reducing its position in
the domestic economy (an interpretation of this result could be a reaction to an announcement
of policy tightness or a rumor of it). The reaction accelerates after the shock hits the economy.
Independently of the foreign reserve accumulation policy implemented by the domestic central bank,
the foreign borrowing by the domestic commercial bank plunges (Figure 2.8, panel A). The fall is
more drastic when an aggressive policy is implemented (Figure 2.8, panel A, solid black line). On
average, the stock of foreign borrowings decreases relative to its initial steady-state; the decline is
higher when the aggressive policy is implemented.
A fall in the foreign borrowing from the advanced economy initially relaxes the accumulation
of reserves in the domestic economy. As the global bank expects an increase in the interest rates
di¤erential after 80 periods, the foreign ows recover and continuously approach their initial steady-
states. This behavior adds pressure to the real exchange rate. Consequently, the intervention rate
reacts to this pressure and starts to increase. The stock of foreign reserves responds, as well.
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The reaction of the real exchange rate (Figure 2.8, panel B) is strongly a¤ected by the im-
plemented policy (or the lack thereof). There is an initial depreciation. The real exchange rate
depreciates more when there is no policy (Figure 2.8, panel B, dotted blue line). The reaction is
smaller under a moderate policy (Figure 2.8, panel B, dashed green line), and it is the smallest
one when the aggressive policy is implemented (Figure 2.8, panel B, solid black line). This result
is in line with the objective of the policy: to reduce the volatility of the real exchange rate. In the
transition, as the foreign capital ows recover, the real exchange rate starts to appreciate. This
behavior is a direct result of the expected increment in the foreign discount factor and the interest
rates di¤erential.
The central bank in the emerging economy plays a vital role when there is a shortage of funds
in the domestic economy (Figure 2.8, panel A). Working as a lender of last resort, the central
bank provides funds to the domestic commercial bank. Since capital and labor fall less when the
aggressive policy is implemented (Figure 2.8, panel A, solid black line), the provision of funds to
the private sector, albeit still relevant, is smaller under this policy.
Capital initially falls as funds are scarcer once the shock hits the economy. Once the domestic
central bank expands its discount window, investment in the domestic economy starts to recover
(Figure 2.8, panel B). Recall that investment depends on the external funding from the banking
system, and with the supply of funds from the central bank, the borrowing cost is barely a¤ected in
the long-run. The recovery of capital accumulation increases investment in the domestic economy.
Labor also drops initially; its fall is more noticeable when the central bank does not implement a
policy (Figure 2.8, panel A, dotted blue line).
Over time, as investment grows, domestic output starts to increase around the 40th period, as
does domestic consumption. It is important to note that time paths of consumption di¤er depending
on the implemented policy (or the lack thereof). When there is no policy, consumption drops more
than when a policy is implemented (Figure 2.8, panel B, dotted blue line). More importantly, with
an aggressive policy, the fast recovery of consumption a¤ects the welfare of the household (Figure
2.8, panel B, solid black line). It also has a wealth e¤ect, and it causes the fall of labor in the
long-run.
In summary, when a country su¤ers a sudden capital ows reversal, the domestic central bank
can reduce the negative e¤ect of the shock by implementing a foreign reserve accumulation policy.
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Moreover, the economy recovers faster, and it is better o¤ in the long-run when the policy is
aggressive (Figure 2.8, solid black line vs. dashed green line). In terms of welfare, there is some
gain in welfare relative to the baseline steady-state. The more aggressive the policy, the higher
the gain in welfare - 4.28% and, only 1.48% with the moderate policy. This result indicates the
e¤ectiveness of the policy as consumption, output, investment are better o¤ under the aggressive
policy (Table 2.8). A wealth e¤ect prevents labor from having the same result. The household
enjoys more leisure as consumption increases.
Sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity analysis explores three alternative scenarios: (1) A permanent TFP volatility
shock, (2) A higher borrowing cost, (3) a more risk-averse household. It is important to emphasize
some results that di¤er from the baseline scenario. Tables 2.9 and 2.10 summarize the results when
moderate and aggressive policies are implemented, respectively. Additionally, Figure 2.9 compares
the response of key macroeconomic variables to a permanent TFP volatility shock 14 with the
baseline response described in the previous section.
Permanent TFP volatility shock. A permanent TFP volatility shock hits the economy (the
persistence parameter increases, V = 0:9999). In Tables 2.9 and 2.10 (middle panel), the column
2 shows that independently of the implemented policy, the reduction in the volatility of output
relative to a no-policy situation is higher than in the baseline scenario. Surprisingly, the reduction
in the volatility of the real exchange is lower than in the baseline scenario when the central bank
implements an aggressive policy (Table 2.10, upper panel column 2). This result could be explained
by the more severe reaction of the economy under this policy. As one can observe in Figure 2.9,
panel D, once a permanent volatility shock hits the economy, the fall in output, consumption, and
investment is more drastic than under a moderate policy (Figure 2.9, panel B).
Nevertheless, it is important to note that when the aggressive policy is implemented, the re-
covery of these variables is faster and more evident. The loss in welfare (relative to a no-policy
situation) under the aggressive policy is 2.56%, while it is only 1.83% with a moderate policy. This
result shows the importance of the policy (in particular, an aggressive one) under a very persistent
14The impulse-responses in the other two scenarios are similar to the ones in the baseline model. They are available
upon request.
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shock, as well as its cost.
Higher borrowing costs. The spread between the loan rate (rL) and the deposit rate (rD)
increases from four percent to six percent annually. Column 3 in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 (upper panel)
show that independently of the implemented policy, the reduction in the volatility of real exchange
rate relative to a no-policy situation is similar to the one in the baseline scenario. In terms of
the volatility of output relative to a no-policy situation, the reduction is noticeable only when an
aggressive policy is implemented (Table 2.10, middle panel column 2). In this particular scenario,
the di¤erent degree of the policy does not a¤ect welfare, as it decreases 0.66% under any policy.
Higher risk aversion. The risk-aversion parameter () goes from two to four. Kollmann
(2015) shows that shocks to the volatility of TFP have the same e¤ect as a shock to the risk-
aversion parameter. Column 4 in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 (upper panel) show that independently of
the implemented policy, the reduction in the volatility of real exchange rate relative to a no-policy
situation is lower than the one in the baseline scenario. The result is similar to the one obtained in
the rst alternative scenario under an aggressive policy. In terms of the volatility of output relative
to a no-policy situation, the reduction is noticeable under the two policies (Tables 2.9 and 2.10,
middle panel column 4).
The extraction of resources from the economy has a higher impact on the welfare of the house-
hold. The losses in welfare (relative to a no-policy situation) under the aggressive and the moderate
policies (2.56% and 1.83%, respectively) are more signicant than the ones in the two previous al-
ternative scenarios. The result could be even more severe if the central bank tries to achieve the
same reduction in the volatility of the real exchange rate relative to a no-policy situation.
In summary, the three alternative scenarios all show a loss in welfare relative to the baseline
exercise. A more precautionary behavior (given a permanent shock or a more risk-averse preference)
explains this result. On average, the welfare decreases more relative to the baseline scenario when
the domestic central bank implements an aggressive policy than in a scenario with the moderate
policy (-2.13% and -1.82%, respectively).
2.5 Conclusion
This study aims to investigate the quantitative e¤ects on key domestic macroeconomic variables
of implementing a foreign reserve accumulation policy. Additionally, the study examines whether
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this policy implementation has welfare e¤ects on the agents in the emerging economy. Given these
goals, it extends an asymmetric two-country model by introducing a global interbank market and
an active domestic central bank that implements a policy of foreign reserves accumulation with full
sterilization.
The policy follows a simple rule that depends on the real depreciation rate. Its implementation
has two degrees: a moderate one and an aggressive one. They depend on the "leaning against the
wind" stance the central bank wants to adopt. The goal of this policy is to mitigate the e¤ect on
the real economy of capital inows that travel from a global bank in a large-advanced economy to
a commercial bank located in a small-emerging economy. Adler and Tovar (2011) and Aizenman
and Lee (2008) present two reasons to justify this policy: (1) a precautionary motive and (2) a
macro-management motive.
To carry out the investigation, I perform two exercises in the model. The rst one analyzes the
e¤ects of policy implementation when volatility shocks hit the economy. The second one evaluates
the reaction of the emerging economy to a reversal of foreign ows. It mimics the markets reaction
during the "taper tantrum" episode in 2013. In each exercise, I compare a scenario where the
domestic central bank implements the policy at a certain degree with a scenario without policy
implementation.
The quantitative model nds that the e¤ectiveness of the policy depends on the degree of its
implementation and the shock experienced by the domestic economy. By implementing this policy,
the domestic central bank diminishes the volatility of the real exchange rate relative to the volatility
of output. Nevertheless, the cost of this nancial stability is that the policy does not increase the
level of output. Moreover, it reduces the welfare of the households in the emerging economy.
On the other hand, the policy is more e¤ective when a sudden reversal of foreign funds shocks
the economy. Under an aggressive policy, the economy recovers faster, and there are some gains in
welfare. Another signicant result is the role played by the central bank as a lender of last resort.
When there is a shortage of foreign funds in the domestic economy, the central bank provides funds
to the domestic commercial bank and restores the ow of funds toward the real economy.
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2.6 Appendix 2.A
Table 2.4 : Estimation Results
Fixed-e¤ects (within) regression. Dependent variable: Foreign Reserves/GDP
Model (1) Advanced + (2) Emerging (3) Emerging Countries
Emerging Countries Countries excluding China
Variable
RGDP Vol 3.48* 3.80** 4.59**
(x10 7) (1.91) (1.61) (1.80)
Ination 0.85* 1.01** 0.67
(x10 3) (0.41) (0.41) (0.27)
RER -0.09 -0.08 -0.17
(x10 3) (0.10) (0.13) (0.07)
Credit -0.02 -0.04 -0.01
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Foreign 0.07 0.41 0.57
Borrowing (0.07) (0.46) (0.48)
Money -0.04 -0.03 -0.01
(0.02) (0.06) (0.05)
Openness -0.03 0.01 0.05
(0.07) (0.10) (0.08)
Observations 519 280 255
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01.
The following equation summarizes the linear regression analysis15 (a xed-e¤ect model):
Yit = ~i +
kX
j=1
~jXj;it + ~it (2.51)
The dependent variable (Yit) in the estimation is the average of the ratio of foreign currency
15The variables on the right-hand side of equation (1) have been previously detrended or demeaned.
A detailed description of the variables included in the study is available in the online appendix.
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reserves (excluding gold) held by the central bank of each country over its GDP. The control
variables (Xj;it) are the real GDP volatility (RGDP vol), the ination rate (Ination), the real
exchange rate (RER), the credit ratio (Credit), the foreign borrowing ratio (For Borrow), the
money ratio (Money), and the openness ratio (Openness). ~i is the country-specic intercept (for
each country i) and ~it is the error term.
The linear regression analysis includes these control variables. The real GDP volatility is dened
as the standard deviation of the cyclical component of the real gross domestic product (RGDP) over
a ve-year rolling window. The measure for the real exchange rate is the real e¤ective exchange rate
index (2010 = 100). The variable Ination is the annual change in the consumer price index. As
described in the WDI database, it reects the annual percentage change in the cost of the bundle
of goods and services by the typical consumer in a country. The variable Openness is the sum of
the exports of goods and services and the imports of goods and services divided by the GDP
In terms of variables related to the domestic nancial system, the study includes three variables:
(1) Credit to non-nancial rms issued by the banking sector as a proportion of GDP (Credit). (2)
An aggregate measure of money in the economy i.e. M2 as a proportion of GDP (Money) used as
proxy for nancial development. (3) Foreign borrowing from foreign banks to domestic commercial
banks (as a proportion of GDP) that measures the ow of funds through a global banking system.
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2.7 Appendix 2.B













Figure 2.2: Nonresident Capital Flows to Emerging Market
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Figure 2.5: Emerging Market (Excluding China) Financial











I IIIIIIV I IIIIIIV I IIIIIIV I IIIIIIV I IIIIIIV I IIIIIIV
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: International Monetary Fund
Figure 2.6: Estimated Cumulative Impact of External Factors on Portfolio
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Figure 2.7 - Impulse Responses - Home Volatility shock
Moderate Policy Aggressive Policy
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Shock: one standard deviation
Red dashed line: Response when no policy. Blue solid line: Response when policy implemented
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Dashed green line: Deviation when Mod pol. Solid black line: Deviation when Agg pol. Dotted blue line: No policy
Scenario 1: Foreign real interest rate: 4%
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Figure 2.9: Impulse Responses - Sensitivity Analysis
Moderate Policy - Home Volatility shock
Baseline Scenario Permanent Shock




























































































































Aggressive Policy - Home Volatility shock
Baseline Scenario Permanent Shock



























































































































Shock: one standard deviation
Red dashed line: Response when no policy. Blue solid line: Response when policy implemented
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Table 2.5 - Long-run equilibrium results (i)
Ratio x/GDP (%)
Data No Policy Policy I Policy II
Foreign Reserves 11.79 0.00 4.28 13.13
Foreign Liabilities 22.21 11.28 16.04 21.64
% with respect to No Policy RER (%)
Real exchange rate Policy I Policy II
Mean 0.05 0.72
Volatility -4.19 -10.63
Relationship RER & FX Reserves
Data No Policy Policy I Policy II
Correlation -0.12 -0.60 -0.61
The data corresponds to Chilean data from 1994 to 2016.
Quarterly, Detrended (HP lter, 1600)
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Table 2.6 - Long-run equilibrium results (ii)
% with respect to No Policy Output (%)
Output Policy I Policy II
Mean -0.09 -0.38
Volatility -1.14 -3.24
Share of GDP (%)
Data No Policy Policy I Policy II
Consumption 66.97 60.85 60.80 60.41
Investment 20.25 21.59 21.66 21.71
Net Exports 1.12 2.78 2.76 3.16
Deposits 43.52 25.36 32.96 34.91
Volatility of x / Volatility of GDP
Data No Policy Policy I Policy II
Consumption 1.07 0.17 0.20 0.27
Investment 0.69 4.28 4.09 3.81
Net Exports 0.62 4.65 4.46 4.18
Labor 0.01 0.27 0.26 0.25
Real exchange rate 0.01 8.44 8.18 7.79
The data corresponds to Chilean data from 1994 to 2016.
Quarterly, Detrended (HP lter, 1600)
52
Table 2.7 - Long-run equilibrium results (iii)
Correlation with GDP
Data No Policy Policy I Policy II
Consumption 0.778 0.65 0.69 0.75
Investment 0.87 0.44 0.41 0.34
Net Exports -0.02 -0.29 -0.27 -0.19
Real exchange rate -0.20 -0.03 0.01 0.12
Labor 0.30 0.61 0.56 0.41
FX Reserves 0.24 -0.65 -0.68
Autocorrelation
Data No Policy Policy I Policy II
RGDP 0.21 0.60 0.64 0.72
Consumption 0.33 0.74 0.75 0.77
Investment 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01
Net Exports 0.34 0.01 0.01 0.01
Real exchange rate 0.70 0.14 0.15 0.15
Labor 0.55 0.02 0.01 0.02
FX Reserves 0.72 0.74 0.67
The data corresponds to Chilean data from 1994 to 2016.
Quarterly, Detrended (HP lter, 1600)
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Table 2.8 - Capital ows reversal results




Foreign Reserves -1160.13 -1199.48
Consumption 0.61 2.94
Investment -5.36 -3.51
Real Exchange Rate -1.74 -3.72
Foreign Borrowing -927.45 -1011.88
Capital -5.65 -4.26
Discount Loans 133456.54 18651.15
Labor -2.48 -3.80
Welfare 1.48 4.28
Foreign real interest rate: 4%
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Table 2.9 - Sensitivity analysis results (i)
Sensitivity Analysis - Moderate Policy
% with respect to No Policy RER
Real exchange rate Baseline 2 3 4
Mean 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.12
Volatility -4.19 -4.28 -4.20 -3.96
Relationship RER & FX Reserves
Baseline 2 3 4
Correlation -0.60 -0.64 -0.60 -0.60
% with respect to No Policy Output
Output Baseline 2 3 4
Mean -0.09 -0.15 -0.09 -0.06
Volatility -1.14 -1.53 -1.20 -1.45
Volatility of x / Volatility of GDP
Baseline 2 3 4
Consumption 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.16
Investment 4.09 4.68 4.07 4.49
Net Exports 4.46 5.13 4.43 4.99
Real exchange rate 8.18 9.25 8.16 8.15
Labor 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.33
Welfare
Welfare loss (%) 1.83 0.66 2.99
Column 2: Permanent volatility shock
Column 3: Higher credit risk
Column 4: Higher risk aversion
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Table 2.10 - Sensitivity analysis results (i)
Sensitivity Analysis - Aggressive Policy
% with respect to No Policy RER
Real exchange rate Baseline 2 3 4
Mean 0.72 1.15 0.78 0.93
Volatility -10.63 -10.34 -10.65 -10.07
Relationship RER & FX Reserves
Baseline 2 3 4
Correlation -0.61 -0.67 -0.61 -0.60
% with respect to No Policy Output
Output Baseline 2 3 4
Mean -0.38 -0.40 -0.38 -0.16
Volatility -3.24 -4.77 -3.41 -4.35
Volatility of x / Volatility of GDP
Baseline 2 3 4
Consumption 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.23
Investment 3.81 4.41 3.78 4.27
Net Exports 4.18 4.88 4.15 4.77
Real exchange rate 7.79 8.93 7.78 7.87
Labor 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.34
Welfare
Welfare loss (%) 2.56 0.66 3.17
Column 2: Permanent volatility shock
Column 3: Higher credit risk
Column 4: Higher risk aversion
56
3 Capital ows, nancial integration and macroeconomic volatil-
ity in an emerging economy
3.1 Introduction
Since the late eighties, emerging economies have experienced a surge in gross capital inows from
advanced economies. As a result of higher nancial integration and loose monetary policies in
advanced economies, these funds have been owing independently from emerging economiesfun-
damentals (Giovanni et al., 2017). Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2018) nd that capital inows have expan-
sionary e¤ects due to higher asset prices, which promote credit expansion in emerging economies,
nance investment, and foster economic growth.
However, higher nancial integration can have adverse e¤ects in emerging economies, notably
when the development of their nancial system is low (Kose et al., 2009). Moreover, Mendoza et
al. (2009) state that di¤erences in nancial development can result in global nancial imbalances.
Emerging economies are also exposed to capital reversals that cause credit bust and asset price
deation (Magud et al. 2014). Hence, the likelihood of being a¤ected by international crises
increases (Devereux and Yu, 2014).
This study aims to investigate how macroeconomic volatility16 a¤ects the accumulation of for-
eign assets, risk-sharing and welfare in an emerging economy that experiences di¤erent degrees of
nancial integration. To carry out this analysis, I simulate the reaction of the economy to volatil-
ity shocks under two scenarios of integration in the nancial system (via debt nance and equity
nance). The rst scenario characterizes low nancial integration as a scenario with high home
equity bias and high transaction costs in international bond markets. The second scenario denes
high nancial integration as lower home equity bias and low transaction costs.
The structure of the model is an international real business cycle (IRBC) model with trade
in goods and an incomplete international nancial market, which is extended by adding a time-
varying business cycle volatility, a certain degree of nancial integration, and recursive preferences.
Kollmann (2014) analyzes the role of macroeconomic volatility using complete nancial markets that
allow perfect risk-sharing across economies. However, Couerdacier, Rey, and Winant (2019) explain
16As is common in the literature, the terms macroeconomic volatility and macroeconomic uncertainty are used
interchangeably.
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that given the limited nancial development in emerging economies, a proper characterization of
the nancial system is the one with incomplete markets.
Additionally, as in Colacito et al. (2018), the households have recursive preferences. This
feature characterizes the risk aversion of the households concerning future consumption but also
future utility. In particular, when the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (RRA) di¤ers from the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), households intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution (IMRS) depends on the future lifetime utility. Annicchiarico et al. (2016)
show that disentangling these parameters (RRA and IES) allows the model to yield a negative
relationship between volatility and economic growth.
After a positive volatility shock hits the domestic economy, the quantitative model produces
a higher accumulation of foreign assets by the domestic representative household. Integration in
nancial markets and the persistence of the shock produce di¤erent outcomes. As the degree of
nancial integration increases and the household can diversify away the domestic income risk, the
precautionary saving motive weakens. Their willingness to accumulate foreign assets diminishes.
A permanent shock strengths the precautionary saving motive, and the domestic household accu-
mulates more foreign assets than in the presence of a transitory shock, independently of the degree
of nancial integration.
In the long-run equilibrium with higher nancial integration, the level of output increases but
also poses a trade-o¤ for the domestic household since the volatilities of output, consumption, and
investment augment. In particular, consumption volatility increases, both in absolute terms and
relative to output volatility. The disconnection between the RRA and IES parameters also plays a
role. A high IES implies a steeper consumption prole over time. Therefore, the household saves
more today to nance future consumption. Additionally, the results show that a high IES implies
a more volatile investment path (relative to output) than the consumption path.
A combination of lower home equity bias and low transaction costs in the bond market allows the
representative household to hedge against any domestic risk. So, the precautionary saving motive
weakens. Fewer resources ow out of the emerging economy, savings go into investment, and output
and consumption rise. The welfare of the household improves when the emerging economy becomes
more nancially integrated.
The motivation for this study follows (1) Fogli and Perri (2015), who point out that time-
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varying uncertainty is a signicant factor in the context of open economies. (2) Gourio, Siemer,
and Verdelhan (2015), who show that uncertainty is an essential driver of capital inows (and
outows) to (and from) emerging economies. (3) Evans and Hnatkovska (2006), who examine the
link between nancial integration and macroeconomic volatility using a two-sector (tradable and
nontradable), two-country (symmetric) world economy.
Macroeconomic volatility a¤ects the accumulation of net foreign assets in advanced economies,
and it can explain their external imbalances in the medium and long-run (Fogli and Perri, 2015).
Empirical evidence shows that the higher global nancial integration recently experienced by emerg-
ing countries has a¤ected their net foreign assets position (Lane and Milessi-Ferreti, 2017). Valchev
(2017) studies how home equity bias has declined in the last few decades as a result of lower in-
formation fees. Hnatkovska (2019) examines the role of hedging motives in the decline of the
home equity bias recently experienced by advanced and emerging economies. Chakraborty and
Dekle (2009) show how the nancial liberalization experienced in East Asia in the nineties can be
characterized as a reduction in the cost of international bond transactions.
Another strand of the literature focuses on the e¤ect of uncertainty shocks in an open-economy
setup. Kollmann (2015) and (2019) incorporates this type of shock into a setup with a two-country,
one-good world with recursive preferences and complete markets. In the rst study, he shows that
volatility and risk appetite shocks are a valuable source of uctuations in net exports, net foreign
assets, and the real exchange rate. In the second study, he investigates how these preferences
are key to magnifying the response of the terms of trade to country-specic shocks. Kollmann
(2016) augments this setup by including two goods (domestic and foreign goods) and examines the
relationship between relative consumptions and the real exchange rate (Backus-Smith puzzle).
Lastly, this study complements others that have investigated the link between foreign assets
dynamics and international portfolios. Couerdacier et al. (2010) include capital accumulation and
international trade in stocks and bonds to generate a realistic equity home bias. Ratanavararak
(2018) adds nancial market imperfections17 to a two-country real business cycle model and ex-
amines the e¤ect of these imperfections in emerging economies. Yepez (2018) investigates the link
between risk sharing and trend shocks in small open economies. Pagliari and Hannan (2017) inves-
tigate how domestic, structural, and global factors a¤ect capital inows to emerging economies.
17The imperfections are borrowing constraints and limited participation in nancial markets.
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The rest of this document is organized into the following sections. The next section (2) de-
scribes the data that motivates this investigation. Section 3 introduces the quantitative model.
Section 4 discusses the benchmark calibration and presents the main results. Section 5 outlines the
conclusions.
3.2 Motivation
Emerging economies have experienced a surge in gross capital inows from advanced economies.
Although the global nancial crisis (GFC) slowed down this process, loose monetary policies in
advanced economies have created a scenario where these funds continued owing independently
from emerging economies fundamentals (Giovanni et al., 2017). In particular, the share of US
investorsportfolios of emerging markets bonds and equities exhibited an upward trend after the
GFC (Figure 3.1).
Historically, the net foreign asset (NFA) position has been negative for most of the countries in
Latin America and some countries in Asia. Taking into account data from Lane and Milessi-Ferreti
(2017) and analyzing some representative countries in each continent18, Figure 3.2 shows that there
has been an improvement in the foreign asset position over time. Moreover, some Asian countries
had a positive position in 2015 as they were net lenders to the rest of the world.
The motivation for this result is that nancial assets have been growing faster than nancial
liabilities. For instance, Chile, and Peru in Latin America and the Philippines, Thailand, and
Malaysia represent this trend. In fact, the Malaysian nancial account shows a pattern similar to
small advanced economies (such as Canada and Korea) and Malaysia had a positive NFA position
in 201519.
Eyraud, Singh, and Sutton (2017) nd strong evidence of lower nancial integration in Latin
America relative to other emerging economies, such as countries in East Asia and Eastern Europe.
Taking into account a measure of de facto openness of the nancial account (computed as sum of
stocks of foreign assets and liabilities as a share of GDP), Figure 3.3 shows that while some East
Asian economies experienced a positive trend in nancial openness starting in the eighties, in Latin
American economies that trend only took place at the beginning of the current century.
18Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) and Asia (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Thailand, and Turkey)
19Lane and Milessi-Ferreti (2017) sample goes from 1970 to 2015
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Initially, the main components of the capital account in emerging economies were ows of
foreign direct investment (FDI) and bond portfolio. As a result of liberalization and further de-
veloped nancial systems, these economies shifted in their external liability position toward equity
investments (additionally, foreign reserve accumulation improved their external position in bond
portfolio) (Mendoza and Smith, 2014). Schmitz (2013) addresses that this shift allowed emerging
economies to share part of their country-specic macroeconomic risks with foreign investors. A
well-known fact in these economies is the higher volatility of their business cycles relative to the
ones in advanced economies (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). Kohn et al. (2018) claim that the
reason behind this higher volatility is sectoral trade imbalances: emerging countries export more
commodities than they import.
Figure 3.4 shows the path of assets and liabilities in the debt portfolio as a share of GDP. Both
of the accounts display an upward trend. A measure of nancial openness in the international bond
markets shows the e¤ects of the nancial integration experienced by these economies over time.
In Latin America, on average, this measure rose from 29% in 1972 to 51% in 2015. Similarly, on
average, the measure in Asian countries increased from 25% in 1972 to 50% in 2015.
There were no foreign transactions in equity markets in the seventies in Latin America nor in
Asia. The liberalization episodes in these continents occurred mostly in the late eighties and the
beginning of the nineties (Bekaert et al., 2005). As a result of higher nancial integration, coun-
tries intensied their access to nancial instruments, and the nancial openness in stock markets
improved (Figure 3.5). In 2015, the sum of assets and liabilities in the equity portfolio as a share
of GDP, was, on average, 21% in Latin America and 18% in Asia.
In 2015, some countries in Latin America experienced a favorable position in the equity portfolio.
In Chile, Peru, and Colombia, the foreign assets exceeded foreign liabilities (33%, 6%, and 2%,
respectively).
The results described above (albeit promising for emerging economies) are still far from the
nancial integration experienced by small advanced economies. For instance, a measure of nancial
openness in bond markets in Australia went up from 11% in 1972 to 146% in 2015. A similar
measure (taking into account the equity market) in Korea was 36% in 2016.
Hnatkovska (2019) shows the evolution over time of the equity home bias in a large sample of
developed and developing countries. She documents a downward trend in the bias across regions
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(Figure 3.6). Specically, while emerging countries still have a higher equity home bias relative
to advanced countries (countries like Brazil or Turkey have a bias close to one), one can identify
developing countries with a degree of home bias approaching values observed in developed countries.
(Figure 3.7). For instance, Chile and Israel have a degree of home bias below 0.7, while Japan and
Canada have a degree of home bias around 0.6.
Furthermore, nancial development in emerging economies is still behind that experienced by
advanced economies, and one indicator is the market for foreign transactions in nancial derivatives.
Aside from Chile and Malaysia, in 2015, there were no foreign transactions of these securities in
the rest of the analyzed emerging countries.
Regulation in investment in foreign assets by emerging economies has become more exible
over time. An example is the constant modication in the restriction on the amount, pension fund
managers in Latin America can invest abroad. The upper limit for these investments has been
increasing in some countries. In Chile, the limit varies from 30% up to 80% depending on the
riskiness of the foreign asset. In Colombia, it varies from 40% up to 70%. The ceiling in Mexico
and Peru is independent of the riskiness of the foreign asset. Currently, it is set to 20% and 50%,
respectively.20
As a result of the introduction of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations21 (ASEAN), foreign
participation has had an upward trend in ASEAN capital markets (Almekinders et al., 2015), in
particular, for the inows of cross-border portfolio investment. Similarly, in South America, the
Latin American Integrated Market (MILA) initiative was introduced in May 2011. The goal was to
reduce barriers to portfolio investments across Chile, Colombia, and Peru (later also Mexico, who
joined in 2014) and to facilitate international transactions across these stock markets.
Nevertheless, in both examples, the ow of funds is still below the one observed in advanced
economies. Moreover, Sandoval and Soto (2016) show that there could be some evidence of cointe-
gration in the stock indices of the markets participating in MILA. This long-run relationship could





21Countries in ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao P.D.R., Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philip-
pines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
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To complement the observed data in this study, an empirical exercise (Appendix 3.A) investi-
gates the relationship between the net foreign assets and the business cycle volatility. This volatility
is dened as the standard deviation of the cyclical component of the real gross domestic product
(RGDP) over a ve-year rolling window. The sample includes a set of advanced and emerging
economies22. In particular, it studies the relationship among emerging economies by restricting the
sample to only this type of small economy.
The result shows a statistically signicant positive relationship between the macroeconomic
volatility experienced by a country and the net foreign assets position in an emerging economy
(Table 3.4, Model 1). The result is consistent with the positive correlation found by Fogli and Perri
(2015) using a sample of developed countries. It also shows a statistically signicant positive rela-
tionship between the net foreign assets position and nancial openness. Higher nancial integration
allows the emerging economy to improve this position as it can hedge against domestic risks.
Lastly, the estimation nds a statistically signicant negative relationship between the net
foreign assets position and trade openness. On average, emerging economies are net importers of
goods23; more integration with global markets allows them to import more and deteriorates their
foreign asset position.
3.3 The Economy
3.3.1 Structure of the model
The structure of the model is an international real business cycle (IRBC) model with trade in goods
and an incomplete international nancial market. It is extended by adding recursive preferences,
time-varying business cycle volatility, and di¤erent degrees of nancial integration. It builds on
the work of Backus, Kehoe, and Kidland (1994), Baxter and Crucini (1995), Heathcote and Perri
(2002) and (2004), and Fogli and Perri (2015). The world consists of two countries: the home
economy and the foreign economy. There are two tradable goods in the world, each one produced
by one of the countries. The size of this world is normalized to one, where the home economy has
22Sample: 1972-2013
Advanced Economies: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, United Kingdom.
Emerging Economies: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey.
23See World Trade Organization annual report in recent years.
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measure m; and the foreign economy has measure 1 m.
An important assumption in the model is that the home country behaves like a small open econ-
omy; therefore, it is unable to a¤ect the foreign country. To characterize this behavior, its measure
approaches zero. The domestic and foreign economies share the same preferences, technologies,
and market structure for the nal goods. Time is discrete, and households live innitely.
Another assumption is that the households have recursive preferences. Under these preferences,
the households intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) depends on the future lifetime
utility. Hence, an increase (decrease) in future lifetime utility, diminishes (raises) the households
IMRS. Annicchiarico et al. (2016) show that when the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (RRA)
di¤ers from the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), the model yields a
negative relationship between macroeconomic volatility and economic growth.
In summary, the model shows an interaction between and within economies of a representative
household and a nal-good producer through the goods market and nancial markets.
The following subsections will provide a detailed description of the home economy. Unless
specied, the typical household in the foreign economy solves a similar optimization problem and
will be presented only if necessary (an asterisk denotes a foreign variable).
3.3.2 Households
Each economy has a representative household that lives innitely and owns non-nancial rms that
produce tradable nal goods. The household consumes a composite consumption good (Ct), which
results from a combination of the domestic tradable good (CHt ) and the foreign tradable good (C
F
t ):
The representative household also supplies labor (Nt) to the rm and is paid the real wage (wt),
expressed in terms of the price of a domestic nal good, the numeraire in the economy. There is
no labor mobility across countries.
The composite good (Ct) has the following structure: a constant elasticity of substitution
production technology (an Armington aggregator) that combines units of the domestic tradable
















where the parameter 1 measures the elasticity of substitution between home tradable input and
foreign tradable input, and the parameter !1 measures the share of domestic tradable input in the
production of the nal good. There is home bias in aggregation of the composite good (!1 > 0:5):
Additionally, following Sutherland (2005), !1 combines the openness of the economy ($) and
the relative size of the economy (m). Therefore, the weight on imported goods is 1 !1 = $(1 m):
The parameter $ 2 [0; 1]; where 0 means a closed economy and 1, a completely open economy.
Given that the domestic economy is a small open economy, m! 0:
The assets in the nancial markets are a risk-free bond (Bt) and domestic and foreign stocks.
The domestic stock is a share (1   ) on the prots (dt) of the domestic goods-producing rms.
Similarly, the foreign stock is a share  on the corresponding foreign prots (dt ): Moreover, 1  
reects the home equity bias ( equal to zero means that the domestic household has full ownership
of domestic prots and none of foreign prots). The composition of this portfolio is exogenous and
given by the degree of nancial integration (home equity bias experienced by the small economy).
More importantly, the domestic household can hold but not trade the equity portfolio24 (as in Fogli
and Perri, 2015).
The bond is non-contingent, hence the nancial market is incomplete and will not allow for
a perfect risk-sharing across countries. The price of the bond is pBt and it is expressed in terms
of the foreign nal good. Qt is the real exchange rate. An increase (a decrease) in Qt represents
a real depreciation (real appreciation). There is a cost associated to the transactions of bonds
(2Bt). The idea is to capture any frictions in the bond market (such as restrictions on purchases,
taxes on nancial assets) and to model how a reduction of these frictions implies a higher nancial
integration (hence, a lower transaction cost)25. The convexity of these transaction costs indicates
decreasing returns to scale.










= wtNt + (1  )dt +Qt [Bt 1 + dt ] (3.2)
The representative domestic household chooses allocations for consumption, labor, and domestic
24Note that when  = 0, there will be only one nancial asset in the economy: the bond. Hence, varying this
parameter helps to study the role of nancial integration across countries.
25Adding the transaction cost not only helps to study the nancial integration across countries but also guarantees
stationarity in the model.
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); with standard properties. Et is the mathematical expecta-
tion conditional upon information available at t, and  is the consumers subjective discount factor
where 0 <  < 1:  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (RRA).  = 1 
1  1
 
; where  is the
intertemporal elasticity of subsitution (IES) parameter.
Two important features of this utility function: (1) It follows Colacito et al. (2018) in the
adoption of the Epstein and Zin (1989) recursive preferences. This feature characterizes the risk
aversion of the households with respect to future consumption but also future utility. In particular,
when the RRA di¤ers from the inverse of the IES, households intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution (IMRS) depends on the future lifetime utility. Therefore, given a common assumption
that RRA is greater that the inverse of IES (Swanson, 2014), the household prefers an early
resolution of uncertainty over future consumption (Weil, 1990). That is the IMRS is decreasing in
future lifetime utility. (2) The function u(Ct; Nt) follows the preferences introduced by Greenwood
et al. (1988) (GHH, henceforth). With GHH preferences, labor supply only depends on the real
wage and not on consumption, therefore there is no wealth e¤ect.




















































































Equation (3:4) characterizes the labor supply, it depends on the real wage. Equation (3:5)
presents the stochastic discount factor. Equation (3:6) shows the relationship between the home
tradable input and the foreign tradable input used in consumption. Equation (3:7) computes the
price of the bond. Equation (3:8) states the risk sharing condition that relates the IMRS of each
of the households (domestic and foreign). Equation (3:9) characterizes the equation of motion for
bonds. Equations (3:10) and (3:11) represent the stock prices of the domestic share of prots and
the foreign share of prots, respectively.
3.3.3 Non-Financial Firms
In each economy, the production sector has a continuum of homogeneous rms. These rms produce
a tradable nal good. Next, I will describe the optimization problem of the representative rm in
the domestic economy. The representative rm in the foreign economy solves a similar optimization
problem.
Final good Producers Problem
The representative rm combines labor (Nt) and capital (Kt) with the available technology (At)
in each country to produce a tradable good (Yt) that will be consumed or invested either domesti-
cally or abroad. The production function is a standard Cobb-Douglas function which satises the
usual Inada conditions. It has constant returns to scale, i.e. the capital share in production ()
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In each economy, the rm owns and accumulates the capital over time. Capital as input is
immobile across countries. There are quadratic adjustment costs a la Hayashi (1982). K is the
adjustment cost parameter. Additionally, the rm reuses the capital that did not yet depreciate.
Equation (3.13) shows the evolution of the capital stock in each economy over time;  is the
depreciation rate.









Domestic investment (It) is also a composite good and has the same structure as the consump-
tion composite good: an Armington aggregator that combines units of the domestic tradable good

















The parameters 2 and !2 measure the elasticity of substitution between home tradable input
and foreign tradable input, and the share of domestic tradable input in production of the nal
good, respectively. !2 > 0:5 (there is home bias) combines the openness of the economy ($) and
the relative size of the economy (m).
The total factor productivity (TFP) in each country follows an exogenous autoregressive process
with time-varying volatility. To characterize the time-varying business cycle volatility, Vt is intro-
duced as the innovations to the standard deviations of the TFP error term. Each country has its
own autoregressive processes for the TFP and its volatility. Each error term of these processes
(At and 
V
t ) has a standard normal distribution. The parameter i (i = A; V ) determines the
persistence of each process.
At = AAt 1 + Vt
A
t (3.15)
At  N (0; 1)




Vt  N (0; 1)
At the beginning of each period, once the productivity shock (At) occurs, the producer goes to a
competitive domestic labor market and hires the labor services (Nt) provided by the representative
household. The labor market clears at an equilibrium wage wt (expressed in terms of the nal
good).
The rm transfers the prots to the household once it sells all the production and pays for the
services of the factors of production. The representative household uses their stochastic discount
factor (t) to discount the future prots (dt).
dt =

Yt   wtNt   IHt  QtIFt

(3.17)









The optimization behavior of the rm in the domestic economy produces the following rst
order conditions:
























































Equation (3.18) shows that the wage paid equals the marginal product of labor. Equation
(3.19) computes the cost of capital (t). Equation (3.20) characterizes the demand for the domestic
investment good. Equation (3.21) presents the relationship between the allocation of domestic and
foreign investment goods.
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3.3.4 Market Clearing, Balance of Payment, Global equilibrium
To close the model, the goods and assets markets in the global economy need to be in equilibrium.































The global supply of bonds adds up to zero:
Bt +B

t = 0 (3.24)
Equations (3.25) and (3.26) dene useful expressions for the domestic net exports and domestic























Denition of equilibrium: The equilibrium consists of factor price (wt), bond price (pBt ),
stock prices (pH;Ht , p
H;F
t ) , real exhange rate (Qt) and allocations (Ct, Nt, Bt, , Kt, It, Yt) that
satisfy the following conditions:
Given the level of technology (At) and prices, allocations (Ct, Nt, Bt,) maximize households
utility and allocations (Nt, Kt, It) maximize nal good producers prots. In addition, the nal-
goods market clears and the asset markets clear.
3.4 Quantitative analysis
3.4.1 Calibration
The objective of this study is to investigate how the higher global nancial integration recently
experienced by emerging countries a¤ects their accumulation of foreign assets. Given this goal,
the parameters in the model are calibrated using values from the literature and data from two
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countries: Chile (as the baseline emerging economy) and USA (as the baseline advanced economy).
Additionally, I use as reference a subset of countries from the data presented in section two. This
subset is divided into two groups: Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) and
Asia (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey). The periodicity is quarterly
Parameter values are summarized in Table 3.1.
In the household sector, the discount factor usually equals 0.99 (Backus et al. (1992) and
(1994)). The country-risk premium observed in the data has a value that goes from 149 basis
points (bps) in Chile to 470 bps in Brazil (sample Latin American countries and an average of 519
bps in the region). Therefore, the discount factor is equal to 0.98625 which represents an annual
interest rate of 5.5% (to match the Chilean data). In terms of labor supply decisions, the parameters
are standards from the literature. The Frish elasticity is 2 and the labor preference parameter is
chosen to obtain a steady-state labor supply equal to one-third. Following Colacito et al. (2016),
the intertemporal elasticy of substitution is 1.526 and the relative risk aversion parameter is equal
to 10.
In the production sector, some parameters are standard values taken from the literature. The
depreciation rate  is 0.025 per quarter for both countries. The capital share  in the production
function is 0.36 for both economies. The elasticity between home and foreign tradable goods
( = 1 = 2) is an essential parameter in measuring the interaction between the two countries.
Following Heathcote and Perri (2002) and Stockman and Tesar (1995), this parameter is set equal
to 0.90 and, for simplicity, the same value applies to both countries. The home bias in production
(! = !1 = !2) depends on the openness ($) and the size of the economy (m). The size of the
small economy is 0.05. Nuguer and Cuadra (2016) assume that the size of the emerging economy
is 4% relative to the world. Using data for the US and a set of Latin American countries, openness
goes from 0.2 to 0.35. Thus, the home bias is 0.6675 for the emerging economy and 0.99 for the
advanced economy. It is noticeable that the foreign country behaves mostly as a closed economy.
261.5 is also a common value used in the nance literature (Bansal and Yaron, 2004)
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Table 3.1 : Calibration
Advanced Emerging Source/Target
Economy Economy
 Capital Share 0.36 0.36 Fogli and Perri
 Discount factor 0.98625 0.98625 BKK
 Depreciation rate 0.025 0.025 Fogli and Perri
 Frish elasticity 2 2 Fogli and Perri
 Labor preference 20.01 6.28 N = 1=3
 Relative risk aversion 10 10 Colacito-Croce
 Intertem. elasticity of substitution 1.5 1.5 Colacito-Croce
 Adjustment cost investment 0.001 0.001
m Size 0.95 0.05 Cuadra and Nuguer
! Home bias 0.99 0.66 Openness/Size
 Elasticity domestic/foreign good 0.9 0.9 Heathcote and Perri
 Adjustment cost bonds 0.005/0.01 Exercise
 Portfolio bias 0.05/0.37 Valchev/Hnatkovska
There are two key parameters in the model. One introduces the home equity bias (), and the
other is related to the adjustment costs in bond markets (). A value of  equal to 0:05 characterizes
a high home equity bias. In a more nancially integrated stock market,  equals 0:37: These values
follow Valchev (2017) and Hnatkovska (2019). In the bond market, a low adjustment cost of bonds
entails a value of  = 0:005 and implies higher nancial integration. High adjustment costs in the
bond market are characterized by a value of  = 0:01.
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Table 3.2 : Calibration - Shocks
Advanced Emerging Source/Target
Economy Economy
A Persistence TFP 0.90 0.90 BKK
V Persistence Volatility 0.90 0.90 Heathcote and Perri
A Volatility TFP 0.01 0.035 Data - PW tables
V Volatility Volatility 0.01 0.025 Data - PW tables27
Correlation TFP 0.40 Fogli and Perri
In order to complete the calibration, the domestic and foreign TFP processes and their volatility
processes need to be dened. The values for the TFP processes were computed using the Penn
World Tables database. Standard values taken from the literature complemented these values. The
persistence coe¢ cient of productivity shock is 0.90 in both economies. The data shows that the
volatility is higher in the emerging economy than in the advanced economy; therefore, the standard
deviation of persistence shock is 0.035 in the domestic economy and 0.01 in the foreign economy
(values for the foreign economy were taken from Heathcote and Perri (2016)). The persistence
coe¢ cient of the volatility shock is 0.90, and its standard deviation is 0.025 in the domestic economy
and 0.01 in the foreign economy. This persistence coe¢ cient increases to 0.9999 in the sensitivity
analysis of the results. Parameter values of the shock processes are summarized in Table 3.2.
In terms of aggregate quantities, the targets for the long-run values of the components of GDP
are the following: the ratio of total consumption to GDP is standard and targets around 0.75 in
both economies. This value is slightly lower than the value found in the data; 0.79 in the emerging
economy and 0.80 in the advanced economy. The ratio of investment to GDP is standard, and its
target is around 0.20-0.25 which is closer to the value found for both the emerging and advanced
economies. Similarly to other studies, investment is higher in the advanced economy. Lastly, the
target for net exports in the domestic economy is a low value, 0%, consistent with the data. The
values for the emerging economy were computed using WB-WDI database and the Central Bank
of Chile. The values for the advanced economy (USA) were computed using the Fred database.
Target values are summarized in Table 3.3.
27An AR(1) process was computed for the cyclical component of the TFP and its volatility using data from the
PennWorld tables. Countries: Emerging Economies: Chile .Advanced economy: USA
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Net Exports/GDP -1.62 1.12
Solution of the model. As pointed out by Fogli and Perri (2015), a third-order approximation
is necessary to capture the impact of changes in the volatility of shocks and to guarantee the
stationarity of the variables in the model. Caldera et al. (2012) show how a third-order perturbation
method is competitive in terms of accuracy with global approximation methods. Specically, I
use the Dynare toolbox to implement a third-order pruned state-space, following the approach of
Andreasen et al. (2016). Born and Pfeifer (2014) echo the discussion of the use of perturbation
and pruning techniques and their implications for the impulse-response functions.
3.4.2 Discussion
This study aims to investigate how macroeconomic volatility a¤ects the accumulation of foreign
assets, risk-sharing and welfare in an emerging economy with di¤erent degrees of nancial integra-
tion. To carry out this analysis, I simulate the reaction of the economy to volatility shocks under
two scenarios of integration in the nancial system. Portfolio 1 corresponds to the scenario where
nancial integration is low, i.e., high home equity bias ( = 0:05) and high transaction cost in the
bond market ( = 0:01). Portfolio 2 describes a scenario with high nancial integration, i.e., lower
home equity bias ( = 0:37) and low transaction cost in the bond market ( = 0:005).
In the stock market, the home equity bias refers to the share of the foreign asset in the portfolio
of the domestic household. A value of  equal to 0:05 implies a share of ve percent. This value
corresponds to a number observed in the data twenty years ago in Chile. By 2016, this participation
had increased to thirty-seven percent. A value of  equal to 0:37 characterizes this reduction in the
Chilean home equity bias; the result of a more integrated nancial system.
The mechanism that operates in the model is as follows: An increment in the uncertainty of
the TFP promotes the accumulation of assets by the household (a precautionary saving motive).
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Given the limited options in the domestic nancial system, some of these resources ow out of the
economy. This outow a¤ects the real exchange rate. The rest of funds migrates from consumption
into investment. A more integrated nancial system allows the household to hedge against the
domestic risk.
Stochastic steady-state
The mean of the third-order approximation of the model to a Monte Carlo simulation28 of all
of the shocks29 characterizes the stochastic steady-state. The shocks follow a Normal distribution.
Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 summarize the main results of the two long-run equilibria. The rst one
(Portfolio 1) assumes low nancial integration, and the second one (Portfolio 2) assumes high
nancial integration, as stated above.
Table 3.5 (upper panel, last row) shows that when there is higher nancial integration, the net
foreign asset position of the emerging economy improves. This outcome is a result of the assumption
of both lower transaction costs in the bond market and a lower home equity bias in Portfolio 2
relative to Portfolio 1. The result is also consistent with the Chilean data (Lane and Milessi-Ferreti,
2017). At the beginning of the nancial liberalization, the Chilean NFA position was -37% as a
share of GDP (an average of this position in the nineties). The position improved over time by
almost twenty percentage points, to -19% in 2015. In the model, the improvement equals only ten
percentage points.
The domestic economy reaches a higher level of output30 when nancial integration increases
(Table 3.5, lower panel). Higher nancial integration allows the representative household to hedge
against any domestic risk. Hence, its willingness to save resources, as a precautionary motive,
diminishes. Additionally, the domestic household has access to higher participation in foreign
dividends, a second but more stable source of funds. Given the rise in the right-hand side of
the budget constraint (3:2), the domestic household can enjoy higher levels of consumption and
investment, although investment increases less because of lower savings.
Higher nancial integration raises the level of output but also poses a trade-o¤ for the domestic
28Simulation: 3,500 times; 550 periods, rst 150 observations dropped. Final number of periods: 400 periods. It
corresponds to 100 years.
29The shocks are: domestic and foreign TFP shocks, domestic and foreign volatility of TFP shocks.
30This outcome should not be understood as a consequence of higher macroeconomic volatility since in the stochastic
steady-state the four shocks interact.
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household since the volatilities of output, consumption, and investment are augmented (Table 3.5,
lower panel). Recall that the household has a high IES ( = 1:5), so their willingness to substitute
consumption over time is large, as they prefer a steeper consumption prole, and the changes in
consumption, after shocks, are small. The opposite happens with investment; the changes (after
shocks) are considerable.
As noted above, a long-run equilibrium with higher nancial integration appears to be related
to increments in consumption volatility (both in absolute terms and relative to output volatility)31.
This scenario combined with a high IES implies a steeper consumption prole over time. Therefore,
the household saves more today to nance future consumption. Moreover, the results show that a
high IES implies a more volatile investment path (relative to output) than the consumption path.
Hence, relative to output, investment volatility is greater than consumption volatility (Table 3.5,
middle panel).
On the other hand, the volatility of the real exchange rate (both in absolute terms and relative
to output volatility) experiences a signicant drop when access to the nancial market improves.
On average, it falls 23.8%, in the long-run equilibrium with high nancial integration. In this equi-
librium, the real exchange rate also achieves a lower level relative to equilibrium with low nancial
integration. The reason for this result is a decrease in the outow of funds from the domestic
economy due to a lower precautionary saving motive. The loss in competitiveness deteriorates the
trade balance in the long-run (Table 3.5, upper panel, third row)
As the home equity bias decreases and the household augments their participation in foreign
prots, the cross-country correlation of output, consumption, and investment worsen (lower panel,
Table 3.6). Again, in terms of consumption, this result indicates no gain in terms of risk-sharing. It
seems the domestic household is not taking advantage of the benets of international risk pooling32.
An explanation could be that the degree of nancial integration in emerging economies is still
low relative to that experienced by advanced economies. Nevertheless, as shown by the data,
consumption is more weakly correlated across countries than output.
Finally, the correlation of key macroeconomic variables and output is barely a¤ected (upper
31Kose et al. (2003) nd that nancial integration seems to be related to higher consumption volatility (both in
absolute terms and relative to income volatility) in many developing countries.
32Bai and Zhang (2012) show that nancial frictions, such as incomplete nancial contracts and limited contract
enforceability, in international nancial markets prevent the international risk-sharing.
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panel of Table 3.6) by changes in the degree of nancial integration. The values are consistent with
the ones observed in the data - positive for consumption, investment, and labor; and negative for
net exports and the net foreign assets position.
Welfare Analysis. Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), the welfare (Wt) obtained by the
representative household is equivalent to the discounted sum of its utility over time. Precautionary
saving by the household a¤ects the time path of consumption and labor. Therefore, this behavior
will have an impact on the welfare of the household. This variable Wt can be expressed in a
recursive form as:
Wt = U(Ct; Nt) + Wt+1 (3.27)
The welfare of the household improves when the emerging economy becomes more nancially
integrated. The reason behind this is the increase in consumption as a result of a weaker pre-
cautionary saving motive. As explained above, a combination of lower home equity bias and low
transaction costs in the bond market allows the representative household to hedge against any do-
mestic risk. Fewer resources ow out of the emerging economy and output increases (around 2.9%)
when comparing the two equilibria in the long-run. In a long-run equilibrium with high nancial
integration, welfare is 10.7% higher than in a long-run equilibrium with low nancial integration.
(Table 3.5, lower panel, lower section)
Volatility shocks
Macroeconomic uncertainty augments after an unanticipated transitory shock (one standard
deviation) to the volatility of the domestic TFP33 hits the economy. In general, one can observe
similar adjustment paths of the main macroeconomic variables, independently of the degree of
nancial integration (Figure 3.8). Therefore, I will rst describe this outcome, following which I
will address the appropriate responses in each scenario.
After a transitory shock hits the economy and the precautionary saving motive takes place, the
domestic household hoards resources. Given the higher riskiness of domestic assets, the household
prefers to accumulate foreign assets to hedge against that risk (Figure 3.8, panel B). Over time,
33The result of a shock to the volatility of the foreign TFP is symmetric and operates in the opposite direction. It
is available upon request.
77
as the foreign position gets stronger and the persistence of the shock decreases, the household is
less concerned about the risk, and the precautionary saving motive weakens. The net foreign asset
position slowly returns to the steady-state. The initial outow of funds a¤ects the real exchange
rate.
Higher nancial integration allows the household to own a higher share of foreign prots. There-
fore, the household is less exposed to domestic income risk. In the "Portfolio 2" scenario, the pre-
cautionary saving motive is weaker than in the scenario with low nancial integration ("Portfolio
1"). This outcome is evident when one compares the accumulation of foreign assets in each sce-
nario (Figure 3.8, panel B, Net Foreign Assets, red dashed line vs. green dash-dotted line). After
the shock hits the economy, and there is low nancial integration, the net foreign assets position
increases up to 0.16% above its initial steady-state.
The lower exposure to domestic income risk promotes a smaller reaction from the household.
The foreign position increases only up to 0.05% above its initial steady-state. It is clear that in the
"Portfolio 2" scenario, the household is less willing to accumulate foreign assets.
Funds ow out of the economy as it becomes riskier. There is real depreciation that enhances the
competitiveness of the emerging economy, increases net exports, and improves the trade balance.
The domestic economy, in the "Portfolio 1" scenario, enjoys a more considerable improvement over
time (Figure 3.8, panel B, Net Exports, red dashed line vs. green dash-dotted line). This outcome
corresponds to a higher outow of funds in this scenario.
Macroeconomic uncertainty not only reduces the domestic return on capital but also freezes the
demand for factors of production by the rms once the shock hits the economy. Capital and labor
barely react on impact. Nevertheless, nancial integration plays a crucial role in the magnitude
of their reaction over time. With low nancial integration, the domestic household sends more
resources abroad. Hence, investment falls, and the recovery of capital and labor is slow under this
scenario ("Portfolio 1"). On the other hand, with high nancial integration and the resultant lower
willingness to accumulate foreign assets (discussed above), households savings ow into investment.
The economy recovers faster under this scenario ("Portfolio 2").
Similarly to empirical studies (e.g. Ramey and Ramey, 1995), higher macroeconomic uncertainty
negatively a¤ects the level of output. Nevertheless, higher nancial integration helps the economy to
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recover faster34. Output falls less in the "Portfolio 2" scenario relative to the "Portfolio 1" scenario
(Figure 3.8, panel A, GDP Home, red dashed line vs. green dash-dotted line), and achieves a higher
adjustment path, albeit eventually returning to its steady-state.
It is important to note that as the income risk increases, the household becomes more patient
(precautionary saving motive) and reduces consumption. This drop is more signicant than the
one observed on the level of output. Over time, as the accumulation of capital increases output,
consumption starts to recover and grows to a level above the initial steady-state (Figure 3.8, panel
A, Consumption Home, red dashed line vs. green dash-dotted line).
The gain in welfare shown above is consistent with the response of consumption and labor to a
volatility shock. The faster recovery in consumption is more evident when the emerging economy
is more nancially integrated with the rest of the world and explains the higher gain in welfare
under this scenario ("Portfolio 2").
Sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity analysis explores two alternative exercises: (1) A permanent TFP volatility
shock, (2) CRA and IES parameters with values used in the macro literature. It is important to
emphasize some results that di¤er from the baseline exercise. Tables 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 summarize
results that arise in the new stochastic steady-state in each exercise. Additionally, Figures 3.9 and
3.10 display the responses of key macroeconomic variables to a domestic volatility shock in each
exercise, respectively.
Permanent TFP volatility shock. A permanent TFP volatility shock hits the economy (the
persistence parameter increases, V = 0:9999). In Table 3.10 (middle panel), row 2 shows that
output increases, but the increment is lower than in the baseline exercise. A permanent shock
strengthens the precautionary saving motive.
The increment in consumption volatility (both in absolute terms and relative to output volatil-
ity) as a result of higher nancial integration is smaller than the one experienced in the baseline
exercise (Tables 3.8 and 3.10, middle panel). It is also necessary to point out, in terms of cross-
country correlation, both output and consumption (Table 3.9, middle panel) have higher values than
34Kose et al. (2006) also nd a negative relationship between economic growth and volatility, but they emphasize
that both trade and nancial integration have signicantly weakened this relationship over time.
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in the baseline exercise. The persistence of the shock could force the household to take advantage
of the benets of international risk pooling.
As a result of the permanent shock, the precautionary saving motive strengthens. The household
accumulates more foreign assets than in the baseline exercise (Figure 3.9, panel B). The magnitude
of the response varies depending on the degree of nancial integration.
Nevertheless, over time, higher accumulation of foreign assets o¤sets the income risk, and the
precautionary saving motive weakens. The NFA position decreases and approaches a positive value,
not its initial steady-state as in the baseline exercise (a direct result of the persistence of the shock).
After a permanent shock, the household becomes even more patient over time and consumption
falls (more than in the baseline exercise). It takes up to forty periods to recover, even when there
was some amount of savings owing into domestic investment and a faster recovery of output,
independently of the degree of nancial integration (Figure 3.9, panel A).
The constant outow of funds from the domestic economy depreciates the real exchange rate
and improves the domestic trade balance over time (Figure 3.9, panel B).
New values for CRA and IES parameters. The risk-aversion parameter () equals four
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution parameter ( ) equals 0.5. These are values often
used in the macro literature. Kollmann (2015) shows that shocks to the volatility of TFP have the
same e¤ect as a shock to the risk-aversion parameter. The precautionary saving motive weakens
relative to the baseline exercise. Row 2 in Table 3.10 (lower panel) shows that, in the long run,
the domestic household is less risk-averse, saves less, and, as a result, output grows less when the
degree of nancial integration increases.
On the other hand, the domestic household now has a lower willingness to substitute consump-
tion over time, relative to the baseline exercise. Notably, investment volatility (relative to output
volatility) drops when compared to the baseline exercise, independently of the degree of nancial
integration (Table 3.8, lower panel). The lower panel in Table 3.9 shows that the cross-country
correlation of investment falls below the value observed in the data, which suggests that values
used in the nance literature outperform values used in the macro literature.
As a result of the transitory shock, the lower risk-averse household saves less than in the baseline
exercise (weaker precautionary saving motive). The net foreign assets position of the households
barely reacts relative to the baseline exercise (Figure 3.10, panel B). Nonetheless, the adjustment
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path of the net foreign asset is not independent of the degree of nancial integration. It shows a
similar behavior to that of the baseline exercise. Finally, the response is less drastic when there is
higher nancial integration; the foreign assets position hardly deviates from its initial steady-state.
After the shock, given its lower degree of risk aversion, the household becomes less patient, and
although consumption falls on impact, the drop is smaller than in the baseline exercise. Neverthe-
less, the factors of production show a di¤erent adjustment path relative to the baseline exercise.
Lower savings forces investment to plunge. The demand for capital and labor decreases on im-
pact and causes a more considerable drop in output. Relative to consumption, this drop is more
signicant than in the baseline exercise (Figure 3.10, panel A).
3.5 Conclusion
Fogli and Perri (2015) show that macroeconomic volatility a¤ects the accumulation of net foreign
assets in advanced economies and that this outcome can explain their external imbalances in the
medium and long-run. Does this result hold for emerging economies? Additionally, what happens
in terms of risk-sharing and welfare?
This study aims to investigate how macroeconomic volatility a¤ects the accumulation of foreign
assets, the risk-sharing and welfare in an emerging economy that experiences di¤erent degrees of
nancial integration. To carry out this analysis, I simulate the reaction of the economy to volatility
shocks under two scenarios of integration in the nancial system (via debt nance and equity
nance). The rst scenario characterizes low nancial integration as a scenario with high home
equity bias and high transaction costs in international bond markets. The second scenario denes
high nancial integration as follows, lower home equity bias and low transaction costs.
The structure of the model is an international real business cycle (IRBC) model with trade in
goods and an incomplete international nancial market; which is extended by adding a time-varying
business cycle volatility and a certain degree of nancial integration. Moreover, as in Colacito et
al. (2018), the households have recursive preferences. Annicchiarico et al. (2016) show that
disentangling these parameters (RRA and IES) allows the model to yield a negative relationship
between volatility and economic growth. Couerdacier, Rey, and Winant (2019) explain that given
the limited nancial development in emerging economies, a proper characterization of the nancial
system is the one with incomplete markets.
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After a positive volatility shock hits the domestic economy, the quantitative model produces
a higher accumulation of foreign assets by the domestic representative household. Integration in
nancial markets and the persistence of the shock produce di¤erent outcomes. As the degree of
nancial integration increases and the household can diversify away the domestic income risk, the
precautionary saving motive weakens. Their willingness to accumulate foreign assets diminishes.
A permanent shock strengths the precautionary saving motive, and the domestic household accu-
mulates more foreign assets than in the presence of a transitory shock, independently of the degree
of nancial integration.
In the long-run equilibrium with higher nancial integration, the level of output rises but also
poses a trade-o¤ for the domestic household since the volatilities of output, consumption, and
investment augment. In particular, consumption volatility increases, both in absolute terms and
relative to output volatility. The disconnection between the RRA and IES parameters also plays a
role. A high IES implies a steeper consumption prole over time. Therefore, the household saves
more today to nance future consumption. Additionally, the results show that a high IES implies
a more volatile investment path (relative to output) than the consumption path.
A combination of lower home equity bias and low transaction costs in the bond market allows the
representative household to hedge against any domestic risk. So, the precautionary saving motive
weakens. Fewer resources ow out of the emerging economy, savings go into investment, and output




Table 3.4: Estimation Results
Fixed-e¤ects (within) regression
Dependent variable: Net Foreign Assets/GDP
Sample: Emerging Economies
Model Emerging Advanced and
Economies Emerging Economies
Variable
RGDP Volatility 2.23* 1.24
(x10 13) (1.11) (1.27)
Financial Openness 0.14*** 0.014
(0.01) (0.03)
Trade Openness -0.23* 0.01
(0.12) (0.13)
Observations 781 1642
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01.
The following equation summarizes the linear regression analysis (a xed-e¤ect model):
Yit = ~i +
kX
j=1
~jXj;it + ~it (3.28)
The dependent variable (Yit) in the estimation is the average of the ratio of the net foreign
asset position to nominal GDP. The control variables (Xj;it) are the volatility of the real GDP
(RGDP Volatility), the nancial openness (dened as the sum of nancial assets and liabilities
over nominal GDP), and the trade openness ratio (dened as the sum of exports and imports over
nominal GDP). ~i is the country-specic intercept (for each country i) and ~it is the error term.
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3.7 Appendix 3.B
Figure 3.1 - Capital Flows
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Figure 3.6: Home equity bias (i)
Regional
Source: Hnatkovska (2019)
Degree of home equity bias: 1 - Ratio of share of foreign equity in portfolio in country i to
share of foreign equity in the world market portfolio
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Degree of home equity bias: 1 - Ratio of share of foreign equity in portfolio in country i to
share of foreign equity in the world market portfolio
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Shock: one standard deviation
Green dash-dot line: Portfolio 1
Red dashed line: Portfolio 2
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Figure 3.9 - Impulse Responses - Sensitivity Analysis (i)






















































































Shock: one standard deviation
Green dash-dot line: Portfolio 1
Red dashed line: Portfolio 2
92
Figure 3.10 - Impulse Responses - Sensitivity Analysis (ii)































































































Shock: one standard deviation
Green dash-dot line: Portfolio 1
Red dashed line: Portfolio 2
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Table 3.5 - Long-run equilibrium results (i)
Share of Output (%)
Data Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2
Consumption 78.96 77.058 80.509
Investment 20.25 23.912 24.056
Net Exports/Output 1.12 -0.970 -4.565
NFA/Output -44.69 4.342 15.118
Standard deviation relative to output
Data Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2
Consumption 1.07 0.409 0.432
Investment 0.70 1.010 1.058
Net Exports/Output 0.62 0.415 0.480
RER 0.01 1.383 0.986
Labor 0.01 0.159 0.149
Relative change between variable x from Portfolio 2






Real Exchange Rate -5.225 -23.753
Welfare 10.682
The data corresponds to Chilean data from 1994 to 2016.
Quarterly, Detrended (HP lter, 1600)
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Table 3.6 - Long-run equilibrium results (ii)
Correlation with Output
Data Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2
Consumption 0.78 0.964 0.958
Investment 0.87 0.972 0.976
Net Exports -0.02 -0.904 -0.931
NFA -0.682 -0.574 -0.738
Labor 0.30 0.995 0.996
Cross-Country Correlations
Data Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2
Output 0.33 0.508 0.488
Consumption 0.20 0.433 0.398
Investment 0.30 0.370 0.344
Labor 0.29 0.426 0.428
The data corresponds to Chilean data from 1994 to 2016.
Quarterly, Detrended (HP lter, 1600)
Table 3.7 - Long-run equilibrium results (iii)
Autocorrelation
Data Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2
Output 0.22 0.673 0.675
Consumption 0.34 0.732 0.737
Investment 0.06 0.659 0.665
Net Exports 0.34 0.673 0.679
RER 0.70 0.770 0.780
Labor 0.84 0.686 0.686
The data corresponds to Chilean data from 1994 to 2016.
Quarterly, Detrended (HP lter, 1600)
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Table 3.8 - Sensitivity analysis results (i)
Standard deviation relative to output














Net Exports 0.396 0.139
RER 1.439 1.030
Baseline scenario: Transitory shock
Exercise 1: Permanent shock
Exercise 2: Lower RRA and lower IES
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Table 3.9 - Sensitivity analysis results (ii)
Cross-country correlation
















Baseline scenario: Transitory shock
Exercise 1: Permanent shock
Exercise 2: Lower RRA and lower IES
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Table 3.10 - Sensitivity analysis results (iii)
Relative change between variable x from





















Baseline scenario: Transitory shock
Exercise 1: Permanent shock
Exercise 2: Lower RRA and lower IES
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